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INTRODUCTION
During the October 2009 Term, the Supreme Court
confronted two issues that, on the surface, appeared to
share little in context or character. In Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez (CLS),' a student group challenged a law
school's withholding of official recognition from the group
for its refusal to comply with the school's policy barring
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.2 Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States3  tested a
requirement that attorneys who furnish bankruptcy-
assistance services include in advertisements a statement to
the effect that: "We are a debt relief agency. We help people
file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code."4
Linking the cases was the plaintiffs' contention that the
government had interfered with their ability to convey their
chosen message-not by forbidding expression of the
message, but by foisting on them speech or association that
would alter or dilute that message. The plaintiffs thus
1. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2. The Christian Legal Society interpreted its by-laws to exclude individuals
who engaged in "unrepentant homosexual conduct." Id. at 2980. See infra text
accompanying notes 313-27 (discussing CLS).
3. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
4. Id. at 1330 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) (2006)). See infra text
accompanying notes 162-67 (discussing Milavetz).
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invoked the negative First Amendment right5 of freedom
from government compulsion to engage in speech or
association that impairs expressive activities.
These challenges also met a common outcome: the
Court's dismissal of the claim as insubstantial or
irrelevant.6 However plausible that result might be in these
two instances, it is also symptomatic of a broader and
unacknowledged vulnerability of negative First Amendment
rights. While some Court pronouncements indicate that
negative and affirmative speech rights occupy the same
constitutional plane,7 the Court's disposition of asserted
negative rights suggests otherwise. Since its generally
recognized origin in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,8 the right to resist governmentally imposed
expressive activities has evolved into a sprawling and
ungainly doctrine. Invoked in efforts to thwart
requirements ranging from acceptance of military recruiters
at law school campuses9 to subsidies for generic advertising
of agricultural products,10 the underlying idea has lost much
of its coherence and explanatory power. Efforts to contain
5. An early use of the term "negative rights" in this context, as
distinguished from affirmative rights to speak and associate, appears in David
B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled
Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 995-96 (1982).
6. Analytical devices for deeming negative rights inapplicable to the issue at
hand are discussed infra Part III.B.
7. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ('[S]ince all
speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid,'...
one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who
chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say."' (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1986))); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (referring to "[tihe constitutional
equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the context of fully
protected expression"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components
of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind."' (quoting W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943))).
8. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See infra text accompanying notes 16-32 (discussing
Barnette).
9. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),
547 U.S. 47 (2006). See also infra text accompanying notes 68-80 (discussing
FAIR).
10. See infra Part I.D.3 (discussing trilogy of advertising cases).
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these diverse issues within a comprehensive principle have
thus produced uncertain application of an increasingly
abstract right. Moreover, regarding this welter of loosely
related areas as governed by a single core concept risks
diluting the principle's potency on occasions where it most
aptly applies." Indeed, the formally co-equal status of a
right to refrain from speakinF has obscured the weakness in
practice of an unadorned2 right to avoid unwanted
communication.
This Article does not propose another general theory or
test for assessing governmental mandates that might be
viewed as implicating negative speech rights.'3 On the
contrary, the Article argues that the various clusters of
holdings ostensibly traceable to Barnette should be
recognized as discrete doctrinal branches to be understood
on their own terms. The idea is hardly novel in First
Amendment jurisprudence. As any treatise on
constitutional law reflects, affirmative speech rights have
long been organized into separate treatments of commercial
speech, the public forum, symbolic conduct, and many other
topics that are colored by transcendent themes but are still
largely self-contained. Part I provides an overview of five
distinct fields in which the Court has entertained claims of
illegitimate government compulsion to engage in speech.
Part II describes the confusion and inconsistency
engendered by attempts to identify a single rationale that
unites this farrago of cases. Part III analyzes how, in the
absence of specific protective principles, negative speech
rights have been susceptible to secondary status.
I. NEGATIVE SPEECH RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS: FIVE
SETTINGS
Rights against compelled speech have been asserted,
and sometimes upheld, in at least five principal contexts.
11. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("To require
a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech
alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.").
12. See infra Part III.A (discussing the notion of "hybrid" rights in this area).
13. For examples of such approaches, see infra notes 349-75 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 59850
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Given the presence of distinctive subcategories,1 4 even this
number understates the breadth of issues encompassed
within the notion of negative speech rights. Moreover, the
concept is sufficiently elastic that the classification scheme
presented here is by no means inevitable."5 However
organized, though, the multiplicity of disputes in which
negative speech claims are brought suggests the futility of
seeking their resolution through a single, overarching
philosophy.
A. Compelled Participation in Voicing the Government's
Message
As noted earlier, the Court's opinion in Barnette is seen
as enshrining the principle of First Amendment protection
against compelled speech. 6 At the same time, however, the
particular ruling embodied by Barnette-invalidation of the
claimant's obligation to personally declare a governmentally
chosen viewpoint-has occurred infrequently in subsequent
cases. Indeed, only the Court's decision in Wooley v.
Maynard7 falls squarely within this template, 8 and even
the conception of that holding as a proper outgrowth of
Barnette has met with considerable skepticism.'9
Barnette represented the culmination of a dramatic
episode in the annals of the Court and the life of the
14. See infra Part I.D (discussing different types of compelled subsidies).
15. For various approaches that differ from this Article's categorization, see,
for example, Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147,148-
50 (2006); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 123, 131 (1999); Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression
and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 169 (2002).
16. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),
547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557
(2005); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
451, 451 (1995).
17. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
18. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557, which characterizes Barnette and Wooley
as "true 'compelled speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged personally to
express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government . . . ." See also
Alexander, supra note 15, at 148, which describes the "BarnettelWooley line" of
cases as comprising only those two cases.
19. See infra notes 43-44, 383 and accompanying text.
2011]
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nation." The State Board of Education had directed public
schools to begin their daily program with a ceremony in
which all students were required to salute the American
flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.2 The plaintiffs, a
family of Jehovah's Witnesses, sought an exemption on the
ground that this conduct clashed with the tenets of their
religion.2 In an extraordinary reversal of recent precedent,23
the Court sustained the plaintiff students' First
Amendment right to refrain from participating in the
ceremony.24
Justice Jackson's memorably aphoristic opinion for the
Court pointedly declined to rest on the free exercise claim
pressed by the plaintiffs.25 Instead, Jackson viewed both
parents and children as invoking a broader "right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and
personal attitude. ' 26 The Court's inquiry thus focused on
whether the State violated that right when it forced
students, whose attendance at school was required by law,
20. For a lucid account of the events leading to the Court's decision, see
Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409, 409-24 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 & n.1 (1943).
22. The Jehovah's Witnesses based their objection on their interpretation of a
passage of Exodus in which God proscribes "bowling] down" to a "graven image."
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629 (citation omitted).
23. The Court had ruled against a similar claim by Jehovah's Witnesses in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599-600 (1940). During the
interim, three members of the majority in Gobitis signaled their retreat from
that position, effectively inviting new legal challenges to mandatory flag salute
ceremonies. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, Douglas,
& Murphy, JJ., dissenting) ("[W]e think this is an appropriate occasion to state
that we now believe that [Gobitis] also was wrongly decided. . . . The First
Amendment does not put the right freely to exercise religion in a subordinate
position.").
24. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
25. Id. at 634 ("[T]he issue [does not] turn on one's possession of particular
religious views or the sincerity with which they are held."). Nor did the Court
deem the school authorities' presumably benign motives relevant to its analysis;
"[s]truggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought
essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by
evil men." Id. at 640.
26. Id. at 631.
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to "mak[e] a prescribed sign and profession" amounting to
"a compulsion ... to declare a belief."27 In the Court's eyes,
the state's interest in promoting national unity28 could not
justify requiring such an "affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind."29 Rather, enforced participation in this
ritual would betray the constitutional commitment to
"individual freedom of mind in preference to officially
disciplined uniformity."3 ° That the plaintiffs' objection may
have contradicted the values and even inflamed the
sensibilities of most citizens was reason to sustain, not
override, that objection. As Justice Jackson declared in one
of the Court's most celebrated passages, "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."3  Accordingly, the Court struck down the
compelled flag salute and pledge as an unconstitutional
invasion of "the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control."32
Over three decades later, the Wooley Court cited
Barnette's bar against such invasions as grounds for
overturning the Maynards' misdemeanor conviction for
covering the state's motto on their license plate.33 New
Hampshire justified mandatory display of the motto, "Live
Free or Die," on noncommercial vehicles as a means of
facilitating identification of these vehicles and of
"promot[ing] appreciation of history, individualism, and
state pride." As Jehovah's Witnesses, however, the couple
found the motto "morally, ethically, religiously and
27. Id. at 630-31.
28. See id. at 631 n.12.
29. Id. at 633.
30. Id. at 637.
31. Id. at 642.
32. Id.
33. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 642).
34. Id. at 716.
2011] 853
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politically abhorrent."35 The Court acknowledged that the
passive display of the motto on the Maynards' license plate
intruded on personal liberty less than a compelled flag
salute, but still found Barnette's central logic directly
applicable.36 That logic flowed from the proposition that the
First Amendment's protection of freedom of thought
"includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all. 37 The crucial feature thus
presented in both cases was state conscription of an
individual to serve as "an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable. 38
Framed by these premises, the issue in Wooley emerged
as "whether the State may constitutionally require an
individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property
in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed
and read by the public."39 The Court's conclusion was
telegraphed by its description of the law as forcing the
Maynards to act as a "mobile billboard" for purveying an
"ideological message" that they found "morally
objectionable."'4 Specifically, the Court determined that the
state could attain its legitimate purposes by "less drastic
means" than making unwilling individuals "courier[s]" for
its chosen message." Moreover, the strength of the state's
interest in promoting ideas associated with the motto was
diminished by its lack of ideological neutrality.42
35. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 n.3 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 430
U.S. 705 (1977).
36. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (describing the difference as "essentially one of
degree").
37. Id. at 714; see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34.
38. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
39. Id. at 713.
40. Id. at 715; see Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech
Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 329, 398 (2008) ("The government... may not get free
advertising through compulsion.").
41. Id. at 716-17.
42. Id. at 717; see Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The
Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV.
817, 852 n.132 (1986) (describing this interest as form of "reverse viewpoint
discrimination").
[Vol. 59854
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Somewhat paradoxically, Wooley underscored Barnette's
indeterminacy even as it illustrated that decision's stature.
Two Justices, while not questioning Barnette's authority,
challenged its relevance to New Hampshire's requirement.
Unlike the schoolchildren in Barnette, argued Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, the Maynards had not been placed by
the state "in the position of either apparently or actually
'asserting as true' the message" to which they objected."
Indeed, he asserted, the state's universally mandated
display of its motto on noncommercial vehicles had not
compelled the Maynards to 'say' anything" at all.
Therefore, neither Barnette nor the First Amendment itself
was implicated by this law."
B. Forms of Imposed Access for Communicative Activities:
Physical Presence and Use of Media
The division over Wooley suggests the challenge of
shaping negative speech rights outside the discrete
circumstance of state-prescribed messages. A major setting
for addressing these rights has been government-mandated
access for private expression. While the Court has
sometimes mustered unanimity in these cases, the different
forms they assume point to the complex considerations that
they raise. It is doubtful, for example, that attempts to
exclude a speaker from one's premises and efforts to prevent
use of one's communications medium should be governed by
a single animating doctrine. Even within these two broad
groupings, each case presents its own distinctive calculus. If
the required display of mottos embossed on license plates
struck some as far removed from Barnette's concerns,
43. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's
dissent was joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 719. Justice White dissented on
procedural grounds. See id. at 717-19 (White, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Randall P. Bezanson, Speaking
Through Others' Voices: Authorship, Originality, and Free Speech, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 983, 1022 (2003) ("[Tihe act of displaying the [licensel plate
cannot be an act of speech for purposes of the First Amendment."). But see
Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight? Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia
Dissent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 581 (2003) ("As with Barnette, the law [in
Wooley] singled out speech or expressive conduct for special compulsion
precisely because of its communicative aspects."); Stephen W. Gard, The Flag
Salute Cases and the First Amendment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 419, 448 (1982)
("Wooley and Barnette area ... not merely analogous, but doctrinal twins.").
2011] 855
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coherent translation of Barnette's philosophy to these varied
issues seems even more problematic.
1. Barring Uninvited Speakers: The Limits of
Resistance. In a trilogy of cases, the Court faced contentions
that the forced presence of outside speakers infringed on the
right to convey only messages of the plaintiffs choosing. The
venues from which exclusion was sought ranged from a
shopping center to law schools to a public parade. The
assertion in two of these cases of an additional negative
speech claim, the right of expressive association,45 further
highlights the pitfalls of facile classification in this realm.
In the first of these cases, PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins,46 the Court reined in the more far-reaching
implications of Wooley. PruneYard involved a group of high
school students soliciting signatures for a petition in
opposition to a United Nations resolution against
"Zionism."47 They set up a table for this purpose at
PruneYard, a privately owned shopping center in Campbell,
California.48 Told to leave because they were violating
PruneYard's regulations, they sought an order granting
them access to the shopping center.49 Ultimately, the
California Supreme Court ruled that the students were
entitled under the state constitution to conduct their
activity at PruneYard. 0 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, PruneYard argued that Wooley represents
the sweeping principle that "a private property owner has a
45. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),
547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 580 (1995). See infra text accompanying
notes 281-85 (discussing FAIR and Hurley). These two cases are treated
principally in this section because their predominant element was forced access,
not a governmentally backed effort by outsiders to join the claimant's
association.
46. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
47. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979), affld,
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
48. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 77; Robins, 592 P.2d at 342.
49. Robins, 592 P.2d at 342.
50. Id. at 347.
856 [Vol. 59
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First Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use
his property as a forum for the speech of others."'"
The Court's opinion rejecting PruneYard's position
distinguished Wooley from the dispute before it in several
ways. First, the character of the shopping center as a
commercial establishment open to the public meant that
observers would probably not identify the views expressed
by the students with those of PruneYard's owner.52
Moreover, in contrast to New Hampshire's imposition of its
motto, California left the selection of messages to members
of the public without preferring a particular viewpoint. 3
Finally, PruneYard could dispel any danger that someone
might misinterpret a speaker's views as PruneYard's own
simply by posting a disclaimer of such a connection.54
Fifteen years later, the Court confronted the issue of
forced access in a case whose setting was quite different
from PruneYard's. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
51. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 85. PruneYard also argued that state compulsion
to open the shopping center to the students constituted a taking of property
without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and a deprivation of
property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 82. The
Court conceded that a literal "taking" had occurred in the sense that "one of the
essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others."
Id. On balance, however, the Court found that PruneYard and its owner had
failed to show that in this instance 'the right to exclude others' is so essential to
the use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation
of it amounted to [an unconstitutional] 'taking."' Id. at 84. Similarly, the Court
concluded that California had not committed a violation of due process because
the inroad on PruneYard's property was rationally related to the purpose of
promoting expression. See id. at 84-85. For criticism of the Court's rejection of
the takings claim, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The
Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 52-53 (1997); Gregory C.
Sisk, Returning to the PruneYardt The Unconstitutionality of State-Sanctioned
Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 389, 412-13 (2009).
52. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
53. Id. ("[N]o specific message is dictated by the State [under California's
requirement]."); see James P. Madigan, Questioning the Coercive Effect of Self-
Identifying Speech, 87 IOwA L. REV. 75, 114 (2001) ('C]ompelled speech claims
are weaker when [there is] diminished fear of government favoritism or
retribution."). But see PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 98-100 (Powell, J., concurring)
(asserting that the right to refrain from speaking would be violated where the
message is chosen by third-party speaker if the property owner's objection to the
message was sufficiently strong to make owner feel compelled to disavow it).
54. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
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and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,55 the respondent
organization ("GLIB") sought to march in South Boston's St.
Patrick's Day parade under its own banner." The South
Boston Allied War Veterans Council, a private association
charged with organizing the parade, refused to allow GLIB
to march as a separate contingent in this manner.57
Applying Massachusetts public accommodations law, state
courts ordered GLIB's admission to the parade.58 The Court
in turn struck down the order, its opinion largely concerned
with the threshold issue of whether the parade should be
treated as cognizable expression. In the Court's view, it was
not necessary for the parade to project a coherent
"particularized message" to trigger First Amendment
protection.59  Rather, the organizers' selection and
combination of "multifarious voices" sufficed to merit
recognition of their activity as speech.6"
Seen in this light, the involuntary inclusion of GLIB's
contingent and banner would inject a dissonant note into
the Council's expressive composition.61 Their presence would
signify the belief that gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons of
Irish descent have the same claim to social acceptance and
Irish identity as their heterosexual counterparts.62
Whatever the Council's reason for excluding this message
from the parade, it enjoyed a constitutional prerogative "not
55. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
56. id. at 560-61.
57. Id. The parade organizers did not object to gay and lesbian participants
marching as individuals. See id. at 572.
58. See id. at 561-64.
59. Id. at 574.
60. Id. at 569-70.
61. See id. at 574 (analogizing the organizers' exercise of discretion in
forming a parade to a composer's creation of a score).
62. Id.; see Gregory J. Wartman, Freedom of Discrimination?: The Conflict
Between Public Accommodations' Freedom of Association and State Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 125, 144 (2003) ('The Supreme
Court correctly determined that forcing the parade organizers to permit GLIB to
march with its banner would be an expressive act that imposed the
organization's message upon them."); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled
Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy,
63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1190 (1997) ("[T]he Court recognized that the [Council]
had a vital interest in controlling the public's perception of its identity as an
Irishness that is naturally and necessarily heterosexual.").
858 [Vol. 59
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to propound a particular point of view."63 The state's
attempt to transform the Council's chosen expression
therefore breached the fundamental principle that "a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message."'
While the Court's unanimity in Hurley suggests the
straightforward application of settled doctrine, its dismissal
of factors deemed crucial to Prune Yard's outcome calls into
doubt the existence of transcendent principles. The source of
unwanted expression in private speakers had supported
California's forced access to shopping centers, but failed to
impress the Hurley Court. Though the speech disfavored by
the Council had not originated with the state,65 GLIB had
enlisted the machinery of state power in a way that
infringed on the Council's right to "exclude a message it did
not like from the communication it chose to make."66
Further, where PruneYard could disavow association with
speakers who had thrust themselves on its premises, the
Court rejected the possibility of similar recourse to the
Council. According to the Court, disclaimers would be
impractical in a moving parade.67
The third decision on physical access for speakers,
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc. (FAIR),68 found the regulation involved closer to
Prune Yard's palatable requirement than to the invalid
compulsion in Hurley.69  At issue was the Solomon
Amendment, which provided for equal access to military
recruiters to institutions of higher learning on pain of losing
certain federal funds.7" The Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights ("FAIR"), an association made up of law
schools, had objected to military recruiting on member
campuses because of the federal policy excluding from the
63. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
64. Id. at 573.
65. The Court conceded that the Massachusetts law did not facially
discriminate against speech based on content. Id. at 572.
66. Id. at 574.
67. Id. at 576-77.
68. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
69. Id. at 65.
70. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2006).
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armed forces persons who had engaged in homosexual acts
or declared homosexual identity. According to FAIR, the
Solomon Amendment placed law schools in the intolerable
position of choosing between conveying a military recruiter's
message or foregoing federal funds.72
In an emphatic-at times disdainful73 -opinion, the
Court unanimously74 rejected the law schools' assertion that
their First Amendment rights had been violated. The Court
pointedly denied the asserted similarity between the
Solomon Amendment and the state's demand in Hurley that
GLIB's contingent be allowed to march under its banner in
the Veteran Council's parade.75 In Hurley, as in other
instances of improper forced accommodation of another
speaker's message, "the complaining speaker's own message
was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate. 7
6
Here, by contrast, the law schools' capacity to project their
views on the wisdom or morality of official policy on
homosexuality in the armed forces would not be impaired by
military recruitment activities on their premises. Unlike
decisions on the composition of a parade, a law school's
serving as host for interviews and recruiting receptions "is
not inherently expressive. '"" Likewise, in contrast to the
71. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52 & n.1 (describing grounds for exclusion (citing 10
U.S.C. § 654 (2006))).
72. Id. at 53; see generally Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO
SUP. CT. REv. 217 (endorsing law schools' position). By ruling that Congress
could have directly required access for military recruiters, FAIR, 547 U.S. at 60,
the Court rendered the statute's funding condition irrelevant to its analysis.
73. See, e.g., FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62 (asserting that comparing law schools'
obligation to send scheduling emails for military recruiters with compelled
speech in Barnette and Wooley "trivializes the freedom protected" in those two
decisions); id. at 70 ("FAIR has attempted to stretch a number of First
Amendment doctrines well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect
[and] exaggeraten the reach of our First Amendment precedents."); see also
infra note 78.
74. Justice Alito did not participate. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 70.
75. See Brief for Respondents at 22, 28, FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152),
2005 WL 2347175 at *22, *28.
76. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 63. The Court had also earlier noted as examples
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) and
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Id.; see infra text
accompanying notes 94-99, 105-16 (discussing these cases).
77. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
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practical impediments to disclaimers in a moving parade,
law schools could readily take measures to disassociate
themselves from military policies.78 Moreover, students'
awareness that military recruiting was taking place
pursuant to federal law made fanciful the fear that they
would ascribe military policies to law schools. 9 Thus, like
the owner of PruneYard, schools possessed effective means
for averting any risk of misattribution. °
2. Commandeering Media. However cloudy the
theoretical unity of cases involving physical access by
speakers, compelled access to communications media
presents an even more scattered picture. It is difficult to
discern a single conceptual thread running through the four
principal decisions on this question. Perhaps the slim
generalization that emerges from this limited roster is
relative solicitude for the prerogatives of print media.
The first of these decisions, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,' sustained the FCC's former fairness doctrine
78. See id. at 65. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Supreme Court Was
Wrong About the Solomon Amendment, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 259,
268 (2006) ("Never before [FAIR] has the Supreme Court said that compelled
speech is permissible so long as the speaker is allowed to disavow the forced
message and engage in other speech."). See infra notes 395-404 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of opportunity for disavowal in negative
speech rights decisions). In a similar vein, the Court rejected the law schools'
claim that the Solomon Amendment violated the law schools' freedom of
expressive association. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68-69. Given the continued ability to
criticize the military's message, the statute did not "affect[] the composition of
the group by making group membership less desirable." Id. at 69-70. For
discussion on the right of expressive association, in particular the negative right
to exclude, see infra Part I.E.
79. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65 ("[H]igh school students can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits
because legally required to do so[.] ... Surely students have not lost that ability
by the time they get to law school." (citation omitted)).
80. Id. In addition, the Court brusquely rejected the law schools' reliance on
Barnette and Wooley, finding the recruiting assistance required of the schools "a
far cry" from the compelled speech in those cases. Id. at 62. The Court also
responded to the schools' contention that their gesture of barring military
recruiters amounted to protected expressive conduct. In the Court's analysis,
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment met the test for regulation of such
conduct promulgated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65-68.
81. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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requiring presentation and fair coverage of public issues by
broadcasters."2 The Court viewed the broadcasters as
asserting the negative speech principle that no one "may be
prevented . . . from refusing in his speech or other
utterances to give equal weight to the views of his
opponents." 3 Whatever the force of this position in other
contexts, the Court believed it was constrained here by the
dynamics of broadcast transmission. With a finite number
of frequencies available, government had been drawn into
allocating broadcast licenses to prevent conflicting signal
transmissions. 4 The Court's constitutional logic thus hinged
on spectral scarcity: "Where there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish."85 The
government could therefore direct a licensee to act as a
"proxy or fiduciary" rather than exploit monopolistic
privilege to bar other perspectives from the airwaves. 6 In
recognizing the public's right to "receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences," the Court recast the broadcasters' version of
the vital First Amendment values at stake: "It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount."87
Over four decades after Red Lion, the implications of its
scarcity rationale for negative speech rights remain
unsettled. Though the Court had intimated an inherent
right of access to broadcast media,8 it declined to order
82. The doctrine was later abolished by the FCC. See Syracuse Peace Council
v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding FCC's action).
83. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
84. See id. at 387-91.
85. Id. at 388; see also Monroe E. Price, Taming Red Lion: The First
Amendment and Structural Approaches to Media Regulation, 31 FED. COMM.
L.J. 215, 227-28 (1979) ("[I]n broadcasting, there can be rules concerning the
allocation of time among competing users so that there is some fairness in the
distribution of what is a scarce resource.").
86. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
87. Id. at 390.
88. See id. ('"The right of the public to receive suitable access to ... ideas and
experiences . . . may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by
the FCC.").
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broadcasters to air paid editorial advertisements in the
absence of a federal mandate.89 In upholding restrictions on
broadcasters' own chosen content, the Court has invoked
justifications other than spectrum limitations.9 ° More
fundamentally, the phenomenon of scarcity itself has been
called into question in the face of proliferation of electronic
media and capacity. The Court had grounded its reasoning
in Red Lion in the "present state" of technology,9 and as
long ago as 1984 raised doubts about the scarcity upon
which heightened obligations for broadcasters were
premised.92 More recently, numerous commentators have
declared a regime of disparate protection for various media
technologically outmoded.93
Nevertheless, Red Lion remains formal precedent, and
stands in conspicuous contrast to the Court's holding five
years later in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.94
There, the Court struck down Florida's "right of reply"
statute entitling a political candidate to space in a
newspaper to respond to the newspaper's criticism of the
89. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973) (Burger,
C.J., plurality opinion) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to broadcaster's
refusal to air editorial advertisement).
90. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978) (upholding FCC
restriction on radio broadcast of comedian's "Filthy Words" monologue); id. at
748 (noting broadcast media's "uniquely pervasive presence").
91. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
92. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984)
(acknowledging criticism of spectrum scarcity rationale as having been rendered
"obsolete" by technological developments).
93. See, e.g., Michael M. Epstein, Broadcast Technology as Diversity
Opportunity: Exchanging Market Power for Multiplexed Signal Set-Asides, 59
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 11-13 (2006); Brittney Pescatore, Note, Time to Change the
Channel: Assessing the FCC'S Children's Programming Requirements under the
First Amendment, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 81, 85-90 (2009); Josephine Soriano,
Note, The Digital Transition and the First Amendment: Is It Time to Reevaluate
Red Lion's Scarcity Rationale?, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 343-48 (2006); see also
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Red Lion and Pacifica were unconvincing when they were issued,
and the passage of time has only increased doubt regarding their continued
validity."). See generally Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54
DUKE L.J. 1359 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the
Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
94. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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candidate. 5 Whatever the possible contribution of this
requirement to press responsibility, newspapers could not
be required "to publish that which 'reason" tells them
should not be published."'96  Such compulsion would
constitute a forbidden "intrusion into the function of
editors," specifically their right under the First Amendment
to make unfettered choices about a newspaper's content,
format, and outlook. 7 In addition to upholding the principle
of editorial discretion, the Court also expressed concern over
the collateral consequences of Florida's statute. An
obligatory published reply would either heap additional
costs on a newspaper or detract from other material that it
intended to publish.98 The prospect of these "penalties"
might dampen publication on controversial matters, as
newspapers steered clear of news and commentary
potentially falling within the statute.99
Tornillo's holding remains established doctrine. 00
Symptomatic of tensions among dispositions of access
requirements, however, the decision occupies an uneasy
relationship with both its predecessor Red Lion and later
cases in which Tornillo was invoked to challenge compelled
access. The absence of reference to Red Lion in the Tornillo
opinion has been criticized as tacit acknowledgement of
friction between the two rulings.' When plaintiffs in turn
relied heavily on Tornillo in two subsequent challenges-
successfully in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
95. Id. at 258.
96. Id. at 256 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18
(1944)).
97. Id. at 258.
98. Id. at 256.
99. Id. at 257. See also Sacharoff, supra note 40, at 345 for a description of
the statute's creation of incentive to avoid certain criticism or coverage as
"particularly problematic because it is both content-based and viewpoint
discrimination: a newspaper triggers the penalty of carrying another's message
if it discusses a candidate or makes a politically partisan attack."
100. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct, 876, 899 (2010) (citing
Tornillo with approval).
101. See, e.g., FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD Guys, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 198 (1975) ('"The Supreme Court's inability to cope with Red
Lion and Tornillo in the same opinion suggests that it recognizes the inherent
contradiction of the two cases.").
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Commission"°2 and vainly in the two identically styled cases
of Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (Turner I103 and
Turner I!°)-the Court was sharply divided in both
instances.
In Pacific Gas, a plurality of a fractured Court looked
heavily to Tornillo in striking down an order by the
California Public Utilities Commission that required Pacific
Gas ("PG&E") to carry materials of a public-interest group
in its monthly billing envelopes. The organization, Toward
Utility Rate Normalization ("TURN"), which routinely
intervened in PG&E's ratemaking proceedings, had objected
to PG&E's inclusion of a newsletter that sometimes
contained political editorials."°5 The Commission instead
determined that the "extra space" in the envelope belonged
to ratepayers, and that TURN could use the space four
times a year to raise funds and to offer ratepayers views
besides those of PG&E.1
0 6
Although PG&E's newsletter may have borne limited
resemblance to traditionally protected media, Justice
Powell's plurality opinion found ample comparison between
the Commission's order and compelled access to newspapers
in Tornillo. Brushing aside any suggestion that PG&E's
corporate status diminished its First Amendment rights,' °7
the plurality condemned the order's "content-based"
102. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
103. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622 (1993).
104. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
105. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 5 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 5-6.
107. See id. at 8 ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining
whether speech is protected."); accord Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,
900 (2010) ('The Court has . . . rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not natural persons."
(internal quotations marks omitted)). For criticism, see Alan Hirsch & Ralph
Nader, "The Corporate Conscience" and Other First Amendment Follies in
Pacific Gas & Electric, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 483 (2004). In addition, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 100, 182 (1986)
asserts that the Court's ruling in Pacific Gas "demonstrated its hostility to
government attempts to equalize effective speech rights in limited fora and
departed considerably from its historic rationale for protecting corporate
speech."
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character.' Here, as under Florida's right-of-reply statute,
access hinged on disagreement with the resisting speaker's
views." 9 Thus, in both cases, fear of provoking and
disseminating a hostile response might deter speakers from
commentary on controversial subjects."0  Even where
deterrence did not restrain speech, speakers under either
regime were forced to associate with speech with which they
disagreed."' They might therefore feel compelled to respond
to the speech for which they served as an unwilling
platform, in violation of the right to choose the topics and
content of their expression. Finally, Justice Powell
deflected the Commission's emphasis on PG&E customers'
ownership of the "extra space" that remained in the billing
envelope once the bill and required notices were deducted
from one ounce." 3 According to Powell, the decision in
Tornillo did not rest on technical conceptions of property."
4
Rather, the underlying constitutional defect was that the
statute required the newspaper to circulate a view that it
opposed."5 This invasion of editorial judgment did not
depend on physical ownership of the paper on which replies
were printed."6
An understanding of the relevance of Tornillo also
figured centrally in the resolution of Turner I and Turner II;
both the context and outcome of Turner, however, differed
markedly from Pacific Gas. At issue were the federal "must
carry" rules that required cable operators to make available
a certain portion of their signal capacity to local commercial
and public broadcast stations."7 Turner I focused on the
108. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 13-14.
109. Id. at 14.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 15.
112. See id. at 15-16.
113. See id. at 17.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Thrner I, 512 U.S. 622, 630 (1993). These provisions had been enacted as
part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1462-63.
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level of scrutiny to which the rules should be subjected. 18
The Court summarily rejected the government's contention
that regulation of cable should be governed by the relatively
relaxed review exemplified by Red Lion."9 Whatever the
continued validity of lenient scrutiny of broadcast
regulation, its rationale of spectrum scarcity did not apply
to the vastly greater-and potentially unlimited-capacity
of cable technology. 2 '
By contrast, the Court gave extended consideration to
cable operators' argument that Tornillo's strict scrutiny
should be applied to nearly automatically invalidate the
must-carry rules. 2' The Court explained that Tornillo
embodied the principle that "[t]he First Amendment
protects the editorial independence of the press," and
reviewed how Florida's right-of-reply statute and the
Commission's order in Pacific Gas ran afoul of that
principle.'22  Unlike compelled access for TURN's
communications, however, the must-carry provisions
differed from the statute in Tornillo in a number of
important respects. In framing its analysis, the Court had
already devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to
discussing the rules' content-neutrality, 23  noting that
"[a]lthough the provisions interfere with cable operators'
editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage to a
certain minimum number of broadcast stations, the extent
of the interference does not depend upon the content of the
cable operators' programming."'2  Confronted with
118. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 636-62.
119. Id. at 637-39.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 653 (describing appellants' position).
122. Id. at 653-55.
123. See id. at 643-52.
124. Id. at 643-44. Four Justices disputed the majority's conclusion that the
rules were content-neutral. See id. at 674-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and
Beyond? Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 19
(1997) ("The legislation itself... demonstrates the heavy content-based nature
of the must-carry rules that should have demanded fatal strict scrutiny."); Karl
E. Robinson, Content Is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Supreme Court Upholds
the Constitutionality of the 1992 Cable Act's "Must-Carry" Provisions, 20 J.
CORP. L. 691, 708-11 (1995).
2011] 867
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
operators' reliance on Tornillo, the Court affirmed this
characterization of the must-carry rules as a crucial basis
for distinguishing its earlier holdings.'25 While access in
Tornillo and Pacific Gas was granted for response to
particular content, the obligation to carry broadcasters'
programs was not triggered by any message expressed by
cable operators. Rather, local broadcasters enjoyed access
irrespective of the content of their programming. 1
6
As further grounds for distinction, the Court did not
think that the must-carry requirement produced the
hazards associated with compelled speech present in
Tornillo. Involuntary transmission of broadcast
programming would not "force cable operators to alter their
own messages" in response.'27 Indeed, "[g]iven cable's
history as a conduit for broadcast signals," viewers were
hardly likely to identify operators with messages contained
in the programs they carried.'28 Thus, must-carry rules did
not pose the risk of incentive to "avoid controversy" that
disturbed the Tornillo Court."19 Moreover, the Court
recognized that the technological gulf between newspapers
and cable created a disparity in control exerted by these
media over their respective audiences. 3 ' The asserted
analogy to Tornillo failed because a newspaper's denial of
access could not prevent readers' turning to other
publications, whereas a cable operator's monopoly
effectively barred viewers' access to programming that it
excluded. 3 '
125. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 655 (majority opinion).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. But see The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 139, 268 (1994), for a discussion of the Court's rationales as unconvincing
because prohibition on compelled speech "is based upon whether the cable
operator is forced to distribute speech that he would not otherwise have chosen
to distribute."
129. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656 (quoting Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974)).
130. Id.
131. Id. ("[A] cable operator [has] bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most
(if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's
home [and] can thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of
the switch.").
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Having rejected strict scrutiny and found the must-
carry rules content-neutral, the Court settled on
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of
review.'32 Congress had justified the rules as advancing
"three interrelated interests: (1) preserving the benefits of
free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting
the widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in
the market for television programming.'M3 Though satisfied
with the sufficiency of these interests,' a majority of the
Court was unwilling to conclude on the record before it that
the rules did not "suppress 'substantially more speech than
necessary"' to further those interests. Rather,
proceedings to produce "a more thorough factual record"
were deemed necessary to resolve this question. 1
36
Ultimately, after "another 18 months of factual
development on remand 'yielding a record of tens of
thousands of pages' of evidence," 3 the Court in Turner II
concluded that the government had demonstrated both the
asserted danger to broadcast television 3 ' and the absence of
substantially less intrusive alternatives to address the
threat.'39 The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause the burden
imposed by must-carry is congruent to the benefits it
affords," the must-carry provisions were "narrowly tailored
to preserve a multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40
percent of American households without cable."'4 ° While the
dissenters accused the majority of having abdicated its duty
to conduct an independent evaluation of pertinent facts,''
132. Id. at 661-62.
133. Id. at 662.
134. See id. at 662-64.
135. Id. at 668 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799
(1989)) (explaining requirement that regulation be narrowly tailored to promote
government's interest).
136. Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
137. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 187 (1997) (citation omitted).
138. See id. at 208-13.
139. See id. at 213-25. Four Justices dissented. See id. at 229 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
140. Id. at 215-16 (majority opinion).
141. See id. at 232 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For criticism of the various
economic theories advanced in the Court's opinion, see Nancy Whitmore,
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the Court stated its refusal to "displace Congress' judgment
respecting content-neutral regulations," which was made in
furtherance of a policy "grounded on reasonable factual
findings supported by [substantial] evidence." '142
C. Mandatory Disclosure of Facts: The Persistent Impact of
the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Cases concerning citizen affirmation of state messages
and access to private premises for expressive activity have
involved objections to serving as vehicles for others'
viewpoints. The Court, on the other hand, has developed a
separate analysis for challenges to compelled disclosure of
facts. With factual statements, the Court has broadly
distinguished between latitude to require provision of
information in the commercial realm and a sterner attitude
toward efforts to force disclosure in the context of "fully
protected"'43 speech. This twofold distinction stands in
notable juxtaposition to the Court's rejection of a sharp
dichotomy between fact and opinion in defamation'" and its
growing reluctance to extend lesser protection to
commercial speech in other respects. "'
Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and Must-Carry Policy: A Flawed Economic
Analysis, 6 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 175, 203-05, 208-11 (2001).
142. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224 (majority opinion).
143. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see
also infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (discussing Riley).
144. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (refusing to
recognize "a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled
,opinion"').
145. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., No. 10-779, slip op. at 1-3 (U.S. June 23,
2011) (striking down a statute that forbade health insurers, pharmacies, and
similar entities from selling, or using for marketing, information identifying the
prescribers of prescription drugs); id. at 22 ("[T]he 'fear that people would make
bad decisions if given truthful information' cannot justify content-based burdens
on speech." (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)));
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion) ("[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from
the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands."). See also
Developments in the Law-Corporations and Society, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2169,
2275-82 (2004) (providing an overview of the Court's broadening protection of
commercial speech that is not false or misleading).
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The Court intimated commercial speech's susceptibility
to special disclosure requirements even as it gave
unprecedented recognition to commercial expression in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.46 That decision struck down
Virginia's ban on advertising the prices of prescription
drugs.'47 To the Court, the State's fear that advertising
would undermine the pharmaceutical profession by luring
consumers to the cheapest rather than best pharmacists'
reflected an impermissibly "paternalistic" philosophy. 149
Instead, the First Amendment enforced the judgment that
"the dangers of suppressing information" outweigh "the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available.""'5 At the same
time, the Court indicated that certain attributes of
commercial speech-especially "objectivity" and
"hardiness"-justified heightened regulation if reasonably
designed to insure that "the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired."'' As a corollary
that modified negative rights in this area, the Court noted
that these features of commercial speech may "make it
appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in
such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its
being deceptive."'52 A later pronouncement broadened the
grounds for governmental insertion of content into
commercial communications: viz., "warning[s] or
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required.., in order to
dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception."'53  Indeed, the Court has endorsed such
146. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
147. Id. at 752, 773.
148. Id. at 768.
149. Id. at 769-70.
150. Id. at 770.
151. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
152. Id.
153. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (declining to foreclose the possibility of
requiring warning or disclaimer in advertisement of type held protected from
ban in order to avoid misleading consumers).
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requirements as less restrictive alternatives to outright
prohibitions of potentially harmful advertising."'
Most notably, the Court elaborated on principles
governing compulsory disclosure of factual information by
commercial speakers in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel.155 There, an attorney challenged Ohio's
requirements that advertisements offering contingent-fee
rates disclose whether the calculation of the contingent fee
included court costs and expenses, and inform clients of
their liability for costs even if their claims failed.'56 Though
conceding that the constitutional right not to speak was
implicated by these rules,'57 the Court distinguished the
speaker's lesser interest in this commercial sphere from
those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio had
not sought to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'58
Rather, the state had merely directed attorneys to "include
in [their] advertising purely factual and uncontroversial
information about the terms under which [their] services
will be available." '59 Since protection of commercial speech is
"justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides," the Court found
Zauderer's First Amendment interest "in not providing any
particular factual information in his advertising [to be]
minimal."'6 ° Accordingly, though "unjustified or unduly
burdensome" disclosure requirements could violate the First
Amendment, requirements like Ohio's would be sustained if
154. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
565 (1980).
155. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
156. Id. at 633. The latter regulation arose from concern that a significant
number of potential clients would not grasp the distinction between "legal fees"
and "costs." See id. at 652.
157. See id. at 650.
158. Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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they were "reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers."'6
Though Zauderer announced a lenient standard for
compelled disclosure of pertinent information about
proposed commercial transactions, it left questions about
the occasions for applying this scrutiny. First, as Milavetz
recently demonstrated, it is not always self-evident whether
the required communication provides no more than "purely
factual and uncontroversial" information.'62  There, the
Court upheld the obligation of attorneys who provide
bankruptcy-assistance services to identify themselves as a
"debt relief agency" as a straightforward implementation of
Zauderer.'63 While the designation was technically accurate
under the Court's interpretation of the relevant statute,6 it
lacked the objective and unexceptionable character of
Zauderer's distinction between legal costs and fees.
However tendentious the plaintiff law firm's complaint of
161. Id. The Court determined that the application to Zauderer of the
requirement that clients' liability for costs be disclosed was sufficiently
reasonable to meet this standard. Id. at 652-53. For an argument that Zauderer
authorizes mandatory disclosure in pursuit of a much wider range of interests
than averting deception, see Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, It's What's
for Lunch: Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef-The First Amendment and
Compelled Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 374 (2007) (statement
of Post) ("Zauderer created a regime that allowed government routinely to
mandate the disclosure of information in order .. . not merely to prevent
deception, but to make markets more efficient."). See generally Caren Schmulen
Sweetland, Note, The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Disclosure
Requirements, 76 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1997) (discussing the government's interest
in maintaining the free flow of consumer information and an honest and open
market).
162. The decision in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,
465, 472, 477 (1997), rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an assessment of
fruit producers for generic advertising of their products, can be seen as hinging
on the premise that the advertising at issue was "uncontroversial." The Court
also assumed, however, that the advertising presented a viewpoint rather than
purely factual information. See id. at 470 ("[It is fair to presume that [the
producersi agree with the central message of the speech that is generated by the
generic program." (emphasis added)); see also infra notes 241-52 and
accompanying text (discussing Glickman).
163. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324,
1340-41 (2010).
164. See id. at 1331-33 (construing Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23).
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the "pejorative" nature of this "compelled self-branding,"6 it
was not alone in questioning whether the label would be
generally understood as signaling the factual content the
government ascribed to it. 66  Judicial grappling with
whether allegedly libelous statements contain factual
assertions1 67 counsels against facile characterization of
required commercial speech as devoid of subjectivity or
controversy.
Even where the factual nature of compelled disclosure is
unambiguous, Zauderer's two-tiered approach toward forced
insertion of information did not address communications
that contain both commercial and fully protected
expression.'68  Three years later, the Court in Riley v.
165. Brief for Petitioners at 88, Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (Nos. 08-1119, 08-
1225), 2009 WL 2841179 at *88.
166. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 767
(D. Minn. 2006) ("The public is more likely to be confused by an advertisement
containing this Congressionally-invented term than one which advertises the
services of a bankruptcy attorney."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 541 F.3d 785
(8th Cir. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010); see also
Marisa Terranova, Attorneys as Debt Relief Agencies: Constitutional
Considerations, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 443, 444 (2008) (describing the
provision as "baffling"). According to the Court, statements that must or could
be included in advertisements-for example, that the advertiser "help[s] people
file for bankruptcy relief'-would dispel potential misunderstanding. Milavetz,
130 S. Ct. at 1341 (internal quotation marks omitted). This position, however,
assumes that the term "debt relief agency" would not alienate potential clients
unwilling to further examine or investigate an attorney's status. A more
extreme hypothetical statute illustrates the problem. If personal injury lawyers
who offered representation at a certain contingency fee were required to identify
themselves by an official designation of "ambulance chasers," it is doubtful that
clarifying language would entirely offset the unsettling impact of that term. See
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.
2009) (striking down required label of "violent video game"), affid on other
grounds sub nom. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); see
also infra notes 395-401 and accompanying text (discussing the efficacy of
disclaimers).
167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Robert D. Sack,
Protection of Opinion Under the First Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill,
"Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 294,
322-24 (2000). See generally Richard H.W. Maloy, The Odyssey of a Supreme
Court Decision About the Sanctity of Opinions Under the First Amendment, 19
TOURO L. REV. 119 (2002).
168. Pacific Gas arguably intimated strict scrutiny in such instances. See Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); see also Antony
Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure
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National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.'69
clarified that the presence of commercial elements would
not automatically disqualify a message from heightened
First Amendment protection. Riley struck down a North
Carolina law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose
to potential donors the percentage of donations actually
turned over to charities over the past twelve months. 170 The
State had argued that its regulation of the profit-generating
aspect of charitable solicitations warranted less stringent
review under the Court's commercial speech framework.'
7
'
In response, however, the Court rejected the proposition
that "speech retains its commercial character when it is
inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected
speech."'17 Instead, the Court declared that "where, as here,
the component parts of a single speech are inextricably
intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one
test to one phrase and another test to another phrase. 73
Nor would the Court accept the contention that the interest
in resisting compelled speech was of a lesser magnitude
than in overcoming restrictions on speech, for it had already
established "[t]he constitutional equivalence of compelled
speech and compelled silence in the context of fully
Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 56 (2005). The essence of the
expression that the Commission sought to inject into PG&E's newsletter,
however, was clearly opinion. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 6 (Powell, J., plurality
opinion) (noting Commission's goal of exposing ratepayers to a "variety of views"
by including TURN's newsletter in PG&E's billing statement (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
170. Id. at 795-801.
171. Id. at 795.
172. Id. at 796.
173. Id. Though the solicitation in Riley offers an obvious vehicle for applying
this principle, the mix of commercial and noncommercial components needed to
trigger heightened scrutiny may not always be clear. For restrictions of
advertising that include commentary on public issues and other noncommercial
topics, the Court has routinely applied its standard for commercial speech. See,
e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989)
(stating that company's discussion of noncommercial matters could be readily
separated from selling products); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 68 (1983) (noting company's ability to address elsewhere public issues
discussed in advertisement); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980) (refusing to extend full protection to
advertising that only "links a product to a current public debate").
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protected expression."'74  Therefore, the Court ruled,
"content-based regulation" like North Carolina's-even
where the content may have met Zauderer's premise of
"purely factual and uncontroversial" information 75
-must
be subjected to "exacting First Amendment scrutiny."1 76
D. The Variegated Problem of Subsidies
Perhaps no field more amply illustrates the
complexities and particularities of negative speech rights
than assessments exacted to support others' expression. The
phenomenon of compelled subsidies has arrived at the Court
in a number of forms. Though the entire area is ostensibly
governed by the Court's seminal holding in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,"77 this body of decisions does not really
comprise a cohesive whole. Rather, challenges to such
subsidies have arisen in at least three discernible sets of
circumstances. Abood can fairly be said to have directly
spawned one line of these cases; the application of Abood's
reasoning to the other two scenarios has been considerably
more strained and attenuated.
1. Assessing Beneficiaries of Private Associations. Abood
called upon the Court to determine the extent to which
forced contributions for expressive activities are considered
tantamount to compelled speech, the purposes for which an
association may mandate fees from its members and
similarly situated beneficiaries, and the means of
apportioning funds to avoid trenching on First Amendment
174. Riley, 487 U.S. at 797.
175. See R. George Wright, Free Speech and the Mandated Disclosure of
Information, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 475, 494 (1991) (describing statute in Riley as
requiring "only a brief, impersonal, presumably correct and uncontested
statement of fact").
176. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798. For criticism that Riley grants excessive
protection to compelled speech, see David W. Ogden, Is There a First
Amendment "Right to Remain Silent"?, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368, 370-71 (1993)
and see also Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the
Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 625 (1991) ('"The
Riley Court['s presumption of] an inherent intertwining of advocacy and
solicitation [which] undermines the real programmatic value of advocacy and
public education by equating it with the public awareness accomplished by the
usual straightforward request for money.").
177. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also infra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
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rights.' In later decisions, the Court both refined Abood's
analysis and applied it beyond the union setting in which it
had originated. Judging by the unanimity of its most recent
decision in this sphere, "7 the Court has apparently attained
significant stability in the specific domain of Abood's most
obvious application.
Abood itself involved a dual challenge to an "agency
shop" clause in a public teacher union's collective
bargaining agreement with the state. 8 ° Under state law a
union chosen by a majority of teachers was obligated to
represent all teachers, including those who declined to join
the union. ' The agency-shop provision in turn required
nonunion teachers to pay service charges to the union equal
to the dues paid by union members.'82 Challenging these
dues on First Amendment grounds, a group of nonunion
teachers asserted both their fundamental opposition to
collective bargaining in the public sector and their specific
dissent from the union's engaging in "activities and
programs" of which they disapproved. 83  The Court
acknowledged that employees' compelled financial support
affected their First Amendment rights when they held
"ideological objections" to the union's performance of its role
as exclusive bargaining representative. 4 Nevertheless, the
Court determined that this impact was outweighed by the
state's interests in promoting peaceful labor relations and
178. See infra text accompanying notes 179-91.
179. See Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798 (2009). Three Justices concurred but
also joined the opinion of the Court. Id. at 808 (Alito, J., concurring). See also
infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text (discussing Locke).
180. Abood, 431 U.S. at 209.
181. Id. at 212 & n.1.
182. Id. at 212.
183. Id. at 212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. at 222 (noting employee's potential objection, for example, to union's
negotiated policy on abortion under medical benefits plan or racial
discrimination in hiring). For a skeptical view of the proposition that compelled
subsidization infringes First Amendment liberty, see Gregory Kass, The Very
Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1087 (2005).
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avoiding "free riders" who enjoy the fruits of union
representation without paying for them.' 5
The Court, however, took a dimmer view of compelled
subsidies for financing "political" activities unrelated to
collective bargaining."6  Such involuntary support
implicated the same underlying First Amendment principle
that protected financial contributions for the purpose of
spreading political messages. 8 7 The Court invoked as well
Thomas Jefferson's pronouncement that "to compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.'8 8
Thus, mandating employee fees to fund dissemination of the
union's politically tinged messages struck at the core First
Amendment principle that "an individual should be free to
believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State."'8 9 The Court recognized the
potential difficulty of distinguishing collective bargaining
activities eligible for compelled contributions from
"ideological" activities, but left the distinction to be fleshed
out in more concrete contexts. 9 ° Even at this stage, though,
the Court was prepared to hold that dissenting employees
bore the burden of registering their objection and seeking
proper apportionment of their fees. ''
185. Abood, 431 U.S. at 219, 222, 224-25; see also Jennifer Friesen, The Costs
of "Fee Speech' Restrictions on the Use of Union Dues to Fund New Organizing,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 624-25 (1988) (discussing government's interest in
preventing "free riding").
186. The term "collective bargaining" is used here as a shorthand reference to
the totality of legitimate purposes for which a union exists. As the Abood Court
noted, these include contract administration and grievance adjustment. Abood,
431 U.S. at 225-26.
187. Id. at 234 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976)).
188. Id. at 235 n.31 (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).
189. Id. at 234-35.
190. Id. at 236. See generally David B. Gaebler, Union Political Activity or
Collective Bargaining? First Amendment Limitations on the Use of Union Shop
Funds, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (1981) (discussing this problem).
191. Abood, 431 U.S. at 237-42. The Court later elaborated on the procedures
by which this rule must be implemented. See Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986) (stating that procedure must be "carefully tailored" to
minimize infringement on employees' First Amendment rights, and that
objecting employees must have fair opportunity to identify the impact of
878 [Vol. 59
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Thirteen years later, the Court was also prepared to
affirm that Abood's analysis transcends the specific setting
of unions. In Keller v. State Bar,"92 a group of California
attorneys asserted that the State Bar was violating their
First Amendment rights by spending their compulsory dues
to finance ideological or political activities they opposed. '
Upon concluding that the State Bar was not a state agency
whose expression was shielded by the government speech
doctrine,' the Court analogized the dynamics of bar
associations and unions. In both instances, the need to
remove the incentive to would-be "free riders" in large part
explained forced assessments of members.'95  While
employee benefits from union negotiations are more
palpable than those that a lawyer derives from a state bar's
activities,'96 a comparable rationale for required dues
applies. A state is entitled to decide that "all of the lawyers
who derive benefit from the unique status of being among
those admitted to practice before the courts should be called
upon to pay a fair share of the cost of the professional
involvement in this effort."'97
At the same time, the Court viewed skeptically State
Bar activities that did not effectuate the state's interest in
regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of
legal services.'98 Echoing Abood, the Court promulgated
"germaneness" as the litmus test for determining the
permissible uses of mandatory fees: "The State Bar may...
fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory
dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner
fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of
challenged expenditures on their interests and to bring First Amendment
claims); id. at 310 ("Lnion's collection of agency fees [must] include an adequate
explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to
challenge amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow
for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.").
192. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. at 11-12. See also infra notes 475-89 and accompanying text
(discussing the government speech doctrine).
195. Keller, 496 U.S. at 12.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 13-14.
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those areas of activity." '99 Further paralleling Abood, the
Court readily acknowledged that the line between these two
classes of activities would not always be obvious."° Still, the
Court found that some of the State Bar's alleged activities
presented no such vexing difficulty, but rather manifestly
could not be funded by compulsory dues: for example,
endorsements of gun control and a nuclear freeze
initiative.2"'
Since Keller, the Court's attention to this area has
focused mainly on giving substance to the general
distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of
compulsory union fees announced in Abood. Though the
most far-ranging exploration two decades ago produced a
fragmented Court in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, °2 its
more recent opinion in Locke v. Karass°3 was endorsed by
every Justice. Even in Lehnert, Justice Blackmun managed
to muster a majority for key portions of his opinion.2 " The
dissenting employees there had complained that their
service fees had been used "for purposes other than
negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining
agreement."" 5 To assess the validity of compelled charges
for union activities, the Court distilled a three-part test
from prior decisions. 6 For an expense to be chargeable to
199. Id. at 14; see also Carolyn Wiggin, Note, A Funny Thing Happens When
You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory Student Fees to Support Political Speech at
Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009, 2015 (1994) ("Organizations can fund
political or ideological speech with the mandatory fees of dissenters as long as it
is germane to the purpose that justifies the compelled association.").
200. Keller, 496 U.S. at 14; see also David F. Addicks, Note, Renovating the
Bar after Keller v. State Bar of California: A Proposal for Strict Limits on
Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 704, 708-11 (1991)
(discussing lack of clarity in line between chargeable and nonchargeable
expenditures).
201. Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-16.
202. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
203. 129 S. Ct. 798 (2009).
204. The case evoked four opinions; substantial parts of Justice Blackmun's
opinion represented the opinion of the Court. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 507.
205. Id. at 513.
206. While looking largely to Abood, see id. at 516-17, the Court also took note
of analogous reasoning in cases involving federal labor legislation, see id. at 514-
16 (discussing, inter alia, Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (construing
Railway Labor Act)). In addition, the Court cited as relevant its decision in Ellis
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all members, it must "(1) be 'germane' to collective-
bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's
vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free riders';
and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union
shop."20
7
Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion reflected the
potentially intertwined operation of these prongs. At issue
in part was a faculty union's use of dues to fund lobbying in
favor of financial support of public employees in general.0 8
Unwilling to entertain such a spacious notion of
germaneness, Justice Blackmun judged the relationship
between this activity and the union's role as bargaining
representative "too attenuated" to justify compelled support
by dissenting faculty.2 9 The lack of specific connection to the
objecting employees' own workplace also entered into the
provision's failure to meet the second part of the test. Given
the divergence between the employees' and union's positions
on this broad public policy, labor peace would not be
advanced by forcing faculty to finance lobbying efforts to
achieve the union's goal.21 Both of these critiques imply
that the union's lobbying in this instance partook more of
politics than work conditions. It was therefore unsurprising
that Justice Blackmun further concluded that using the
plaintiffs' funds for such "political lobbying" would
significantly and unnecessarily add to the existing
encroachment on their First Amendment interests.2
Expenditures for public relations activities designed to
enhance the teaching profession similarly foundered on
their insufficient link to the union's collective bargaining
function and excessive burden on First Amendment
rights.212
v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984), sustaining the use of dissenters' funds
for union conventions, publications, and social events, as ancillary to the
permissible imposition of an agency shop. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 518-19.
207. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519.
208. Id. at 511.
209. Id. at 520 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
210. See id. at 521.
211. See id. at 521-22.
212. Id. at 528-29.
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Charges for activities conducted outside the bargaining
unit fared better in Lehnert, but a crucial application of the
principle established would not be resolved until Locke. A
majority in Lehnert agreed that a local bargaining unit
could charge objecting employees their pro rata share of
costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities of the
unit's state and national affiliates." 3 To qualify, the
activities need only ultimately-not directly-benefit the
local unit."4 The eligibility of expenses for litigation beyond
the dissenting employees' bargaining unit, however, split
the Lehnert Court into "three irreconcilable factions. ''215
Revisiting the issue in Locke, a unanimous Court
determined that no peculiar feature of litigation
distinguished it from other national activities for which
local units could be charged.2 6 Instead, assessments could
be imposed where they funded extra-unit litigation that
appropriately related to collective bargaining and was
reciprocal-i.e., could "ultimately inure to the benefit of the
members of the local union by virtue of their membership in
the parent organization. 2 7
2. The Distinctive Problem of Student Activity Fees.
While the Court extended its treatment of union charges to
bar association dues, it has not categorically rendered
suspect all extraction of funds to support expression with
which the objector disagrees.18  On the contrary, the
framework developed in Abood is not easily transplanted to
settings and circumstances well-removed from the collective
bargaining arena. This difficulty is illustrated in Board of
Regents v. Southworth,219 where the Court acknowledged the
limitations of the "germaneness" criterion that evolved from
Abood.
213. Id. at 524.
214. Id.
215. Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2009).
216. See id. at 806-07.
217. Id. at 806-07 (quoting Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524).
218. The most conspicuous example of this principle is a governmental
expenditure for a program that a taxpayer finds repugnant. See Norman L.
Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in
Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 22-23 (1984).
219. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
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In Southworth, students at the University of Wisconsin
challenged the university's mandatory student activity
fee.22 Some of the funds generated by the fee were allocated
to student organizations that engaged in political or
ideological speech.' The plaintiffs asserted that they could
not be required to subsidize organizations whose views they
opposed.2"' Invoking Abood and Keller as well as other
rulings upholding negative speech rights, they argued that
this arrangement clashed with the principle that the First
Amendment "broadly prohibits government efforts to force
unwilling citizens to contribute to the private speech of
others." '223 The Court agreed that the activity fee entailed a
compromise of students' First Amendment rights,224 but
refused to confine this mandatory contribution to speech
"germane" to the purposes of the university.2  In the Court's
eyes, such a standard foundered on related practical and
philosophical grounds.226 The university supported a host of
student organizations in order to "facilitate a wide range of
speech" that was distinguished "not by discernable limits
but by its vast, unexplored bounds."' Accordingly, a
"tgermaneness" test would prove not only "unworkable" 2 '
but also "contrary to the very goal the University seeks to
pursue. 229
Southworth suggests the "vast" bounds230 of the range of
subsidies that might invite challenge, and the Court's
refusal to apply Abood's template there points to a
corresponding need for individually tailored analysis. Thus,
the Southworth Court did not look for primary protection of
220. Id. at 221.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See Brief for Respondents at 14-18, Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (No. 98-
1189), 1999 WL 618376 at *14-*18 (citing, inter alia, Barnette and Hurley).
224. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231.
225. Id. at 231.
226. Id. at 231-32.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 231; see also id. at 232 (rejecting alternative requirement to permit
each student to list acceptable causes as excessively "disruptive and expensive").
229. Id. at 232.
230. Id.
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objecting students' rights in negative rights jurisprudence
at all, but instead in a ruling on withholding subsidies from
certain groups. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia,23 ' the Court invalidated a university's
refusal to allow student activity fees to fund any student
organizations that "primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality."'232 Rather, the university was obligated to distribute
these funds without regard to the viewpoints of students
who applied for them.23 Similarly, the student challengers
in Southworth could find refuge in Rosenberger's principle of
viewpoint neutrality to guard against ideological bias in the
allocation of funds.234 The parties' stipulation that the
university's system for encouraging student speech operated
in a content-neutral manner earned the Court's provisional
approval of the program.235 However, a mechanism for
subjecting specific allocations to a student referendum 236
threatened that principle by potentially "substitut[ing]
majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality. ' 237 The
Court therefore remanded the case for investigation to
resolve this question and to assure the program's adherence
to the constitutional command of neutrality toward
beliefs.238
3. Subsidized Generic Advertising's Muddled Trilogy.
The Court has also grappled with obstacles to applying
Abood's logic in cases involving mandatory charges to
producers to fund generic advertising messages. A trilogy of
rulings on challenges by objecting producers.. has resulted
in a widely held perception of "doctrinal instability and
231. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
232. Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Id. at 829-30.
234. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233.
235. Id. at 234.
236. See id. at 224-25.
237. Id. at 235.
238. See id. at 235-36.
239. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v.
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot,
Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
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incoherence""24 in the area. In a sense, the disjunction
between Abood and its wavering application is more jarring
here than in Southworth, for the economic dynamics of
collective bargaining would seem to have more in common
with commercial advertising than with the aspirations to
intellectual diversity animating the student activity fee.
Even the first of the three decisions, though invoking
the "germaneness" test, displayed tension over the
relevance of Abood's construct to industry check-off
programs. Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.24 '
concerned the validity of marketing orders promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.242 In particular, the
Secretary had launched a generic advertising campaign
promoting the virtues of "California Summer Fruits," which
was funded by assessments imposed on producers of these
fruits.243  A group of tree handlers, asserting their
disagreement with some of the content of the advertising,
challenged the use of mandatory fees to subsidize these
messages. " In response, the Court rejected both reliance on
its test for regulation of commercial speech 245 and the
suggestion that Abood "announce[d] a broad First
Amendment right not to be compelled to provide financial
support for any organization that conducts expressive
activities. 246 Rather, Abood had more narrowly recognized
an interest in "not being compelled to contribute to an
240. Sullivan & Post, supra note 161, at 365 (statement of Sullivan); see also,
e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial
Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and
Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 558 (2006) (referring to "doctrinal uncertainty
and embarrassment" that "plagued" Court's decisions on compelled subsidies for
generic advertising); see also infra notes 419-20 and accompanying text
(discussing arguable inconsistencies among these decisions).
241. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
242. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)() (2006). The orders had to be approved by either two-
thirds of the affected producers or producers who marketed at least two-thirds of
the volume of the commodity. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461-62 (citation omitted).
243. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461-62.
244. Id. at 467. One of the messages that the plaintiffs argued was conveyed in
the advertising was that "all California fruit is the same." Id. at 468 n.ll.
245. Id. at 474 (referring to test set forth in Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
246. Id. at 471.
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organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's
'freedom of belief."'2  Given the plaintiffs' presumed
agreement with the "central" message of the generic
advertising campaign, they-unlike the objecting
contributors in Abood and Keller-were not compelled "to
endorse or to finance any political or ideological views." '248
The conclusion that these forced assessments generated
no "crisis of conscience '  to trigger Abood's protection
stirred ambiguity and dissent in Glickman. Despite holding
that the assessments did not encroach on First Amendment
rights, the Court further ruled that the generic advertising
at issue was "germane" to the larger purposes of the
Secretary's marketing orders.25 ° Conversely, four dissenters,
speaking through Justice Souter, accused the majority of
espousing a stunted conception of Abood's reach. Far from
excluding commercial and nonideological speech, Abood, in
their view, stood for the unqualified proposition that
compelling expenditures for protected speech impinges on
First Amendment rights to the same degree as forbidding
such expenditures.25 1 Thus, even if the plaintiffs agreed with
the advertisements' bland message of the goodness of
California fruit, their preference for making different claims
about their Rroducts sufficed to activate First Amendment
safeguards.'
Any suggestion that Glickman had granted unfettered
license to compel subsidies for generic advertising-or even
just generic advertising of agricultural products-was
dispelled four years later in United States v. United Foods,
Inc.253 United Foods involved a challenge to a federal law
creating a Mushroom Council authorized to impose
mandatory assessments on handlers of fresh mushrooms.254
247. Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977)).
248. Id. at 469-70.
249. Id. at 472.
250. Id. at 473; see Post, supra note 240, at 572 (noting the Court "somewhat
mysteriously" applied the germaneness test).
251. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 487-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 489.
253. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
254. Id. at 408; see also Nicole B. Cisarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say:
Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929,
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In practice, the bulk of the funds raised by the assessments
were spent on generic advertising of mushrooms.255 The
plaintiff, a grower and distributor of mushrooms, objected
mainly to the advertising's presumed message that
mushrooms are generally fungible, effectively contradicting
the plaintiffs preferred message that its own mushrooms
were superior to other mushrooms. 56
With Glickman as obvious precedent, the United Foods
Court identified crucial distinctions in structure and
substance from the constitutional assessments for
advertising California fruits. While the required subsidies
in Glickman formed one facet of a "broader regulatory
scheme," the "principal object" of forced contributions for
advertising mushrooms was "speech itself."'257 The absence of
a larger regulatory program served by the advertising
precluded the possibility of compliance with Abood's
"germaneness" test, for it left no purpose to which the
campaign could be germane.258 Abood's hostility toward
compelled subsidies for speech in "conflict with freedom of
belief," on the other hand, had fatal relevance for the
obligatory payments in United Foods.259  Unlike the
presumed harmony of viewpoints between the challengers
and sponsors of the advertising in Glickman, here the Court
perceived the government as prejudicing a disfavored
participant in a private debate. 6 Moreover, the economic
and arguably trivial nature of the disagreement did not
preempt First Amendment scrutiny; the Court refused to
960 (1998) (asserting that Glickman "constitutes a serious departure from
traditional... compelled speech analysis").
255. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408 (discussing Glickman)
256. See id. at 411.
257. Id. at 415. Howard Wasserman has characterized United Foods as
distinguishing between funding expressive and nonexpressive activities.
Wasserman, supra note 15, at 201 ("[Wlhere the expressive activity comprises
only a small portion of the range of nonexpressive activities engaged in with
compelled funds, the program must be understood as nonexpressive, such that
payers may not object to any uses of their funds.").
258. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-16.
259. See id. at 413.
260. See id. at 411 ("First Amendment values are at serious risk if the
government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to
pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors.").
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recognize any principle that "distinguishes out of hand
minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better
than just any mushroom." '261 Nor did the power sustained in
Zauderer262 to compel disclosure in commercial advertising
save the forced assessments in United Foods. These
assessments, "imposed to require one group of private
persons to pay for speech by others," bore scant resemblance
to the Zauderer provision's advancement of the interest in
preventing deception in "voluntary advertisements." '263
While United Foods thus displayed the complication
attending even this narrow niche of negative speech issues,
the final case in the trilogy, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n,2" raised doctrinal uncertainty to a new level. This
time, the disputed advertising campaign promoted
consumption of beef, in particular through the familiar
slogan "Beef. It's What's for Dinner."'65 The advertisements,
along with other "beef-related projects," were funded by a
federal tax imposed on sales and imports of cattle.266 The
plaintiff beef producers, invoking United Foods,267 objected
that the advertising's promotion of beef as a "generic
commodity" contradicted their own messages touting the
superiority of their beef.268
The Court's analysis rested on a pair of dichotomies.
Canvassing previous decisions, the Court observed that
First Amendment challenges had succeeded in both "true
'compelled-speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged
personally to express a message he disagrees with, . . . and
'compelled-subsidy' cases, in which an individual is required
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
263. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416. But see Post, supra note 240, at 562-63
(arguing that United Foods is in tension with Zauderer because Zauderer
represents the principle that compelled commercial disclosures implicate
minimal First Amendment interests and may serve the purpose of "promot[ing]
transparent and efficient markets").
264. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
265. Id. at 554.
266. Id.
267. See Brief for Respondents at 14-17, Johanns, 544 U.S. 550 (Nos. 03-1164,
03-1165) 2004 WL 2362873, at *14-*17.
268. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 556.
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* . . to subsidize a message he disagrees with."'269 Prior
examinations of mandated subsidies, however, had all
involved compelled support for the expression of private
entities,27 ° which the Court deemed "fundamentally different
from compelled support of government.""27  Since the
government is entitled to tax citizens to fund programs that
they oppose, the Court reasoned, it follows that some of
those funds can be spent for expression advocating
programs and their underlying policies. 72 Accordingly,
Johanns hinged on whether the promotional messages could
be fairly considered the government's speech.273 Perhaps
counter-intuitively, the Court determined that the
advertising-much of it stating "Funded by America's Beef
Producers"-could be formally and functionally ascribed to
the government.274 Though the campaign was developed by a
committee with substantial private representation,275 its
message was "from beginning to end the message
established by the Federal Government. 276 Whatever the
involvement of nongovernmental actors, the content of the
advertising was "effectively controlled by the Federal
Government itself. '27 7 Consistent with the rationale for
269. Id. at 557.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 559 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13
(1977)).
272. Id. at 559.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 475-83 (discussing further the concept
of immunized government speech).
274. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 555.
275. See id. at 553-54.
276. Id. at 560-61. Commentators have echoed Justice Souter's criticism in
Johanns that the government's sponsorship of the beef advertising campaign
was too obscure to justify invocation of the government speech doctrine. Id. at
577-79 (Souter, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:
When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 666
(2008) ("Because most advertisements bore the tag 'Funded by America's Beef
Producers,' a reasonable person would probably conclude that private cattle
ranchers were speaking."); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and
Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 988-89 (2005).
277. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560 (majority opinion); see id. at 561 (noting the
Secretary of Agriculture exercised "final approval authority over every word
used in every promotional campaign"); see also ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[W]hen the government determines an
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distinguishing government speech from private messages,
the beef advertisements were subject to political safeguards
of the legislative and administrative processes, and of the
program's implementation by a "politically accountable
official." ' Admittedly, the plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights might be implicated if viewers would likely perceive
the advertisements as the plaintiffs' expression.279 The
record produced by the plaintiffs' facial challenge, however,
established no such attribution. °
E. Group Speech and the Fluctuating Right to Exclude
As noted earlier, Hurley upheld the Veterans Council's
right to reject alteration of its chosen message,2"' while the
FAIR Court dismissed law schools' claim that the presence
of military recruiters impeded their association's ability to
convey its viewpoint on the military's policy toward
homosexuality. 82 In a sense, these decisions addressed
negative speech rights in the context of expressive
association: the "freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas. 2 3 In both cases, the
overarching message and retains power to approve every word disseminated at
its behest, the message must be attributed to the government for First
Amendment purposes.").
278. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563. But see Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 631
(2008) (arguing that political accountability did not "providea any meaningful
check on the government's action" in Johanns).
279. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7; id. at 565 (reserving question of
whether as-applied challenge would succeed if record demonstrated that beef
advertisements were attributed to plaintiffs). See also id. at 568, where Justice
Thomas, in his concurrence, assumes the as-applied challenge is valid if the
advertisements have associated their message with plaintiffs because
government "may not ... associate individuals or organizations involuntarily
with speech by attributing an unwanted message to them, whether or not those
individuals fund the speech, and whether or not the message is under the
government's control."
280. Id. at 565-67. The Court remanded the case, presumably for further fact-
finding on whether the advertisements were being identified as the plaintiff beef
producers' speech. See id. at 567.
281. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
283. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also Paul M. Secunda,
The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and Public Employment, 54
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asserted impact of state compulsion on the association's
capacity to project its viewpoint was at once direct but
ephemeral. While each association resisted affiliation with
speakers whose message contradicted its own, these
amounted to relatively isolated episodes of forced
interaction.284 In other instances, organizations have alleged
a more central invasion of their capacity to express ideas:
viz., state requirements-typically in the form of
antidiscrimination laws-that the organizations grant
membership to individuals who allegedly will change or
detract from their message.285 Addressing this clash, the
Court achieved a tenuous unanimity in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,"6 but two more recent decisions, Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale287 and Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
(CLS),288 split 5-4, with only Justice Kennedy joining both
majorities.
Roberts sustained enforcement of a Minnesota
antidiscrimination law forbidding local chapters of the
Jaycees to comply with the national organization's exclusion
of women from full voting membership. 289 The Jaycees, an
organization expressly devoted to fostering the civic
engagement, ersonal development, and friendship of
"young men, 2  claimed violation of its First Amendment
rights, contending that the inclusion of women could change
both its goal of promoting the capacities of young men291 and
UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1784 (2007) (describing right as "association for the
promotion of rights found primarily within the First Amendment").
284. See Sisk, supra note 51, at 403 ("Access to campus by any employer,
military or otherwise, tends to be infrequent and sporadic.").
285. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),
547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006), for a distinction between laws that grant access to
"outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire
students" from laws that force an organization "to accept members it does not
desire" (citation omitted).
286. 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see infra note 297-99 and accompanying text.
287. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
288. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
289. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613-17 (discussing Jaycees' by-laws and state's
application of public accommodations law).
290. Id. at 612-13.
291. See Brief for Appellee at 30, Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237 at *30.
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its positions on matters of public policy.292 The Court's
opinion, supported in full by five Justices, 1 acknowledged a
number of principles ostensibly favorable to the Jaycees: the
Jaycees' freedom of expressive association encompassed the
"right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends";294 requiring the admission of objectionable
members works a manifest intrusion into an association's
"internal organization or affairs";295 and state abridgements
of this "freedom not to associate" must be subjected to
stringent scrutiny.296 Ultimately, however, the Court was
"persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens
justifies the impact that application of the statute to the
Jaycees may have on the male members' associational
freedoms." '297 At the same time, the Court did not credit
arguments that admission of women would transform
messages conveyed by the Jaycees.298  Besides, any
"incidental abridgement" of the Jaycees' speech would be
292. Id. at 20-21, 31-32.
293. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment without opinion, Justice
O'Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, and Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun did not participate. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631.
294. Id. at 622.
295. Id. at 623.
296. See id. (stating that infringements must "serve compelling state interests
• .. that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms"). In a concurring opinion praised by scholars, see, e.g.,
Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale:
A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1563-87 (2001) (proposing
"tripartite" framework developing Justice O'Connor's suggested approach);
Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1896-97 (1984), but spurned by the Court, see
Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational
Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191, 218 (2005), Justice
O'Connor proposed distinguishing between heightened First Amendment
protection of predominantly expressive associations and more permissive
scrutiny of infringements on the associational freedom of predominantly
commercial associations. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (majority opinion); see also N.Y. State Club Ass'n
v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1988) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (citing
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626).
298. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
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"no greater than is necessary" to attain the state's purpose
of curbing gender discrimination.299
The fragile consensus of the truncated Roberts Court
was shattered when the decision's reach was tested in Dale.
Dale had invoked a New Jersey antidiscrimination statute
to overturn his dismissal as assistant scoutmaster due to
his homosexuality.3"' Upholding the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment challenge to the state court's ruling, the Court
first determined that the organization's mission to "instill
values in young people" amounted to "expressive
association.""3 Among the values set forth in its mission
statement were those of keeping "morally straight" and
"clean," which the Boy Scouts contended were incompatible
with homosexual conduct.3 2  While acknowledging the
ambiguity of these terms,3 3 the Court deferred to the Boy
Scouts' assertion concerning the nature of its expression.'4
The Court declared as well its obligation to defer to "an
association's view of what would impair its expression. '"305
Describing Dale as "an avowed homosexual and gay rights
activist," o6 the Court acceded to the Boy Scouts' position
that Dale's presence in the organization would distort its
299. Id. at 628; see Linder, supra note 296, at 1880 (noting conflict in Roberts
between "two well-established American principles: associational freedom and
equality"). See generally Carpenter, supra note 296, at 1533-63 (discussing
proper balance between preservation of latitude for group speech and
organization and state ability to pursue compelling equality objectives). The
Court also rejected the Jaycees' argument that Minnesota's law violated the
right of intimate association recognized in cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right of parents to raise children without undue
interference from state), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978)
(right to marry without confronting discriminatory obstacles imposed by state).
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-21. The Court found that the Jaycees' size,
entrepreneurial character, and lack of selectivity rendered its membership
restrictions "remote from the concerns" underpinning this form of liberty. See id.
at 620-21.
300. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000).
301. Id. at 648-50.
302. Id. at 649-50.
303. See id. at 650.
304. See id. at 651-53.
305. Id. at 653; see also infra text accompanying notes 405-18 (discussing the
problem of deference).
306. Id. at 655-56.
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message of disapproval of homosexuality. °7 As in Hurley,
forced acceptance of an unwanted participant would impede
the association's "choice not to propound a point of view
contrary to its beliefs. 3 °8
Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Stevens
delivered a caustic assessment of the majority's premises
and reasoning. Skeptical that the Boy Scouts had assumed
a consistent stance against homosexuality,"9  Justice
Stevens pronounced the Court's deferential approach on
this score "an astounding view of the law."31 Moreover,
Dale's mere membership in the Boy Scouts would not
convey the association's endorsement of homosexuality. 31 1
The majority's contrary conclusion, argued Justice Stevens,
meant that "an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with
the label 'homosexual' . communicat[ing] a message that" ,,312
permits his exclusion wherever he goes.
307. See id. at 653.
308. Id. at 654; see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1932 (2001) ("The Boy Scouts get to control the content of
their own parade, so to speak."). The Court distinguished Roberts and Rotary
Club as involving state antidiscrimination laws whose enforcement in those
cases "would not materially interfere with the ideas that the organization
sought to express." Dale, 530 U.S. at 657.
309. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 686. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of
Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 130 (2000), for a
challenge to the requirement that the Boy Scouts "express a strong, consistent
position from the outset on the immorality of homosexuality in order to preserve
its decisional autonomy."
311. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 694.
312. Id. at 696; see Madigan, supra note 53, at 102 (denying that the Boy
Scouts would be "forced to declare an allegiance to homosexuality just because a
gay person is among them"); David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 121, 122 (2001) (asserting that the Court has never adopted a theory
of "expressive identity" under which "personal characteristics such as race,
gender, or sexual orientation are inherently expressive within the meaning of
the speech clause"). But see Nancy J. Knauer, "Simply so Different" The
Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 89 Ky. L.J. 997, 1071 (2001), for an assertion that Justice
Stevens's argument "overlooks ... the present political reality of what it means
to be an openly gay individual" and that though "[i]t certainly seems unfair that
Dale's mere presence in a Scoutmaster's uniform sends a message . . .at least
for now, it does." Others have argued that even if New Jersey's statute impinged
on the Boy Scouts' associational interest, its application in Dale deserved to
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A decade later in CLS, application of a
nondiscrimination policy to a group opposing homosexuality
evoked another sharp division on the Court. In this
instance, however, the sincerity of the association's avowal
of an exclusionary philosophy was not questioned. The
association, the Hastings College of Law chapter of the
Christian Legal Society ("CLS"), sought the law school's
recognition as a "Registered Student Organization" ("RSO")
a status accompanied by a number of tangible benefits."'
3
Hastings rejected the application on the ground that CLS
by-laws violated the school's policy of withholding RSO
status from student organizations excluding persons on the
basis of (among other categories) religion or sexual
orientation."4  Under tenets prescribed by its parent
organization, these by-laws barred persons who engaged in
"unrepentant homosexual conduct" or professed religious
beliefs different from those set forth in the organization's
"Statement of Faith. 31 5
While the clash in CLS raised large questions of
principle,31 6 the legal debate within the Court centered on
specific issues of fact, precedent, and doctrine. In Justice
Ginsburg's account for the majority, Hastings was applying
a "viewpoint-neutral" policy of requiring every student
group seeking RSO status to welcome "all comers."3 '7 Justice
Alito's dissent, reviewing the same record, perceived the
school's representation of an all-comers policy as pretext for
discrimination against a group with obnoxious views.3"8 By
survive strict scrutiny. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The
Expressive Interests of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 612 (2001).
313. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2979-80 (2010).
RSOs were granted, inter alia, use of school funds and facilities. Id. at 2979.
314. Id. at 2980.
315. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 143, 165-66 (2010); Adam Liptak, Rights and Religion Clash in Court
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A24.
317. See CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
318. See id. at 3001-06 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Hadley Arkes, Vast
Dangers in a Small Place, FIRST THINGS, June-July 2010, at 33, 34-35; Patricia
Millett et al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free Speech in the 2009
Term, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 24-26 (2010). Justice Alito's dissent was joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. The Court did not
entirely rule out the theory of pretextual enforcement; it remanded the case for
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extension, the two sides differed over the relevance of Healy
v. James,319 which had overturned a university's denial of
official recognition to a local chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society ("SDS"). 320 The dissenters viewed CLS as
essentially identical to Healy and saw the Court's refusal to
apply Healy's protection to CLS as simply distaste for the
group's beliefs.32' Conversely, the Court asserted that
Healy's ban on restricting groups' First Amendment
activities because of their "abhorrent" views was not
violated by the law school's "paradigmatically viewpoint
neutral" policy. 22 Finally, the majority and dissent gave
antithetical assessments of whether the restriction on CLS's
right of association advanced Hastings' interest in
preserving the RSO program as a limited public forum. The
Court's inquiry, conducted in light of its educational
context, 323 accepted several justifications offered by the
school for its all-comers requirement, including "ensur[ing]
that the leadership, educational, and social opportunities
afforded by [RSOs] are available to all students ' 324 and
encouraging "tolerance, cooperation, and learning" by
bringing together students of "diverse backgrounds and
beliefs.1,12' According to the dissent, however, such
rationales confused ends with means. The RSO forum
fostered various opportunities by allowing students to form
groups in a manner of their choosing;326 by the same token,
the benign values espoused by Hastings could be
constitutionally promoted by pluralistic respect for each
group's right to confine membership to those who share its
convictions.327
consideration of CLS's argument that Hastings had engaged in discriminatory
application of its all-comers policy. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (majority opinion).
319. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
320. Id. at 189 (finding that the university failed to demonstrate the chapter
posed a threat of "material disruption").
321. See CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 3007-09 (Alito, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 2987 & n.15 (majority opinion) (quoting Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88).
323. Id. at 2988.
324. Id. at 2989 (citation omitted).
325. Id. at 2990 (citation omitted).
326. Id. at 3014-15 (Alito, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 3014-16. For the argument that Hastings' action violated the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see Richard A. Epstein, Church and
[Vol. 59896
NEGATIVE SPEECH RIGHTS
II. THE ILLUSORY IDEAL OF A UNITARY THEORY OF
COMPELLED SPEECH
The breadth of cases reviewed in Part I points to the
futility of uniting these disparate circumstances in a
discrete doctrine of negative speech rights. Neither the
Court nor scholars have agreed on an explanatory principle
beyond an abstract level of generality. Unsurprisingly, the
pursuit of such a principle has engendered tensions and
inconsistencies in the Court's jurisprudence. Commentators
have proposed various standards to govern these cases, but
a definitive framework remains elusive.
A. The Indefinite Basis of Negative Speech Rights
The fallacy of ascribing a single aim to negative speech
rights is suggested by the absence of this approach in the
realm of affirmative expression.32  Instead, the First
Amendment's protection against restraints on speech is
widely thought to derive from three variously
complementary, overlapping, and colliding purposes.329 First
is the search for truth through preservation of a free
marketplace of ideas.33 ° A second theory posits that the First
State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 2010 CATO SuP. CT.
REV. 105, 121-23, 131.
328. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 68 (1984) ("Deriving a consistent theory of the First Amendment
from the myriad opinions of the Supreme Court represents a task similar to
defining the inside and outside of a M6bius strip; that which appears logical at
one point evaporates from another perspective." (quoting W. Parker
(unpublished paper, Duke Law School))).
329. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-87 (2d ed.
1988).
330. The metaphor, of course, was coined by Justice Holmes. Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... "). John Stuart Mill is generally associated with the idea that
tolerating even erroneous opinions advances the pursuit of truth. See JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 14-15 (R.B. McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell 1947)
(1859); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 45 (1986) ("[The
dominant value associated with [free] speech is its role in getting at the truth
..... ); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970)
("An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the
question....").
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Amendment is concerned foremost with promoting the
robust debate on public issues essential to democratic self-
government.331 Under a third conception, free speech serves
intrinsic rather than instrumental values, enabling
individual self-fulfillment and self-determination.332 These
themes have informed the Court's consideration of negative
speech rights as well.333 Just as broad principles have
331. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269-70, 273 (1964) (indicating that this purpose is the "central
meaning" of First Amendment); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-27 (1948) ('The welfare of the
community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them....
That is why freedom of discussion... may not be abridged.").
332. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (describing the "liberty model" of the free speech
guarantee); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
333. See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997) ("[I]t has long been a basic
tenet of national communications policy that the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("By
protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government
attack, the First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving
information."); id. at 14 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (observing the value of
controversy and "vigorous debate" under First Amendment); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State."); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 715 (1977) ('The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold
a point of view different from the majority ...."); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1973) ("[A]t the time the First Amendment to the
Constitution was ratified ... [a] true marketplace of ideas existed .... "); id. at
258 ("[T]reatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-
constitute[s] the [protected] exercise of editorial control and judgment."); Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 n.18 (1969) ("He must be able to hear
[the arguments of adversaries] from persons who actually believe them; who
defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them." (quoting MILL,
supra note 323, at 32)); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631
(1943) (recognizing "a right of self-determination in matters that touch
individual opinion and personal attitude"); id. at 636-37 (describing enforcement
of the Bill of Rights as "a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in
preference to officially disciplined uniformity").
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crystallized into separate doctrines of affirmative speech,
however, rights of resistance to government-compelled
speech should not be treated as an undifferentiated whole.
The multiple foundations of negative speech rights are
suggested by Barnette itself, which has been assigned a
number of meanings.334 In referring to "individual freedom
of mind,"'335 "individual opinion and personal attitude,"'336 and
similar concepts, the opinion indicates the First
Amendment's solicitude for individual freedom of thought
and conscience.337 A mandatory flag salute interferes with
that freedom by imposing a kind of cognitive dissonance
between what a person says and thinks,338  and by
threatening to indoctrinate citizens in a particular set of
beliefs.339 In addition, this forced recitation of repugnant
views-compelling an individual "to utter what is not in his
mind"34 -- undermines the sincerity upon which effective
dialogue depends.34 ' Even where the force-fed message does
334. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 410 (asserting that there is
widespread uncertainty around the grounds upon which the Court reached its
decision in Barnette); see also Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public
Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 708 (1987) (noting
"hard questions" raised by the opinion's "most quoted rhetoric").
335. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
336. Id. at 631.
337. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 433-34; Harpaz, supra note 42, at
902 (referring to the opinion's concern with "first amendment interest in
intellectual individualism"); Nadine Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and
"Scientific Creationism"' Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular
Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 367
(1986).
338. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 438; Martin H. Redish & Kirk J.
Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory:
Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083,
1114 (1999).
339. See Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in
Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647, 655 (2005); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He
Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out" Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox
of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 605-07 (1993).
340. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
341. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 435-36; see also Michael K.
Steenson, Pledging Allegiance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 747, 765 (2003)
(stating that compulsory flag salute deprives individuals of right to "speak their
minds" by forcing them "to make a statement with which they disagree"). But
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not conflict with the views of the involuntary speaker,
Barnette can be seen as encompassing the right not to
engage in public declarations of ideological positions.342 Nor
are the interests implicated by Barnette necessarily
confined to the domain of the First Amendment;
government compulsion to speak may violate rights of
autonomy under substantive liberty as well.343 Finally,
Barnette can also be understood as safeguarding the
integrity of democratic self-government by forbidding the
state to impose its orthodoxy on dissenting citizens."
With Barnette's lone holding subject to such varied
construction, it is not surprising that the larger body of
cases touching negative speech rights has resisted coherent
exposition.345 The heterogeneity of these cases is suggested
by the distance of some from Barnette's affirmation of "the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order." '346 The place of compelled subsidization of
commercial messages in this jurisprudence, in particular,
has repeatedly been called into question.347 Even matters
see Alexander, supra note 15, at 161 ("[T]hat people who are coerced to say
things they do not believe are harmed by saying those things ... remains
undemonstrated .... ).
342. See TRIBE, supra note 329, at 1315 (observing that Barnette's principle
protects against compulsion to express beliefs, "whether actually held or only
vacantly mouthed").
343. See Greene, supra note 16, at 480-82.
344. See Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 707-08
(2004); Martin Guggenheim, Stealth Indoctrination: Forced Speech in the
Classroom, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 68-69.
345. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 125 (describing the Court's decisions on
compelled speech claims as "a patchwork of cases with no clear thread that ties
them together"); Elad Peled, Constitutionalizing Mandatory Retraction in
Defamation Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 33, 68 (2007) (denying that
"all kinds of compelled speech should be treated alike"); Sullivan & Post, supra
note 161, at 374 (statement of Post) (criticizing the Court for the "mess"
resulting from its attempt to "fashion a one-size-fits-all doctrine" for compelled
speech).
346. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
347. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right
against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1109-26 (2005);
Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association, 2005 SuP. CT. REV. 195, 217 ("[T]he mere fact that
individuals have been compelled to subsidize speech with which they disagree is
not sufficient to justify constitutional scrutiny.").
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thought closer to Barnette's core concerns, however, have
eluded clarity of principle. In resolving issues of expressive
association, for example, the Court has been faulted for
failure to adequately define its scope.348
Thus, resolution of negative speech issues has been
marked not by uniformity of principle, but rather by
overlapping and interweaving themes whose importance
ebbs and flows in different contexts. Among the most
prominent of these is the concept of "individual freedom of
mind" in Barnette that was invoked by the Court in
Tornillo,349 Wooley,35° and Riley."' The idea has intuitive
appeal; government dictation of the content of one's
expression interferes with citizens' ability to independently
formulate their thoughts.352  On the other hand, this
principle does not comprehensively account for all
invalidations of government compulsion that violate
negative speech rights. It seems unrealistic that the
inclusion of the GLIB contingent in Hurley, payment for
mushroom advertisements in United Foods, or admission of
Dale to the Boy Scouts would have appreciably impaired the
deliberative processes of those who challenged these
requirements."' Still, even where state compulsion to speak
does not detract from cognitive capacity, it may still infringe
on constitutionally recognized dignitary interests.
Requirements to display the government's chosen slogan or
to support an unpalatable political cause, for example, can
348. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural:
Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1497-
98 (2001); Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations,
and Public Employment, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1785 (2007).
349. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
350. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
351. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797
(1988).
352. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 432.
353. See Sacharoff, supra note 40, at 361 ("[A] focus on . .. the speaker's
freedom of mindo actually hampers any justification for the compelled speech
doctrine."); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY 56 (1982) ('The argument [for free speech] from self-fulfillment suffers
from a failure to distinguish intellectual self-fulfillment from other wants and
needs.").
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be seen as violating rights of conscience.354 Involuntary
expression of others' beliefs can also dilute or distort the
projection of one's own views.355 Further, acquiescence in
government directives to voice the messages of others may
result in a diminished sense of self356 that is incompatible
with assumptions about the role of citizens in our
constitutional system.357
Another principle, liberty from "ventriloquism"-i.e.,
being branded with an unwanted viewa5-resembles
freedom of thought as a powerful but scattered influence in
negative speech rights.3  One ground for invalidating the
order to include TURN's newsletter in PG&E's billing
statement in Pacific Gas, for example, was that customers
might mistakenly attribute the association's views to
354. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t the
heart of the First Amendment is the notion that ... one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."); see
also Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
367, 410 (2010) (discerning in Wooley and Abood the principle that "personally
and directly spreading" an ideology against one's will constitutes "an offense to
the privacy of the conscience").
355. Redish & Kaludis, supra note 338, at 1115 ("[T]here would exist a serious
risk that the impact of the speaker's utterance of her own views would be
diluted as a result of... having to mouth a position which the speaker finds
abhorrent.").
356. See Gaebler, supra note 5, at 1006 (stating that an individual's
compliance with this type of requirement causes "feelings of shame and disgrace
resulting from his inability or unwillingness to defy the state on a matter of
principle"); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link Between Student Activity Fees and
Campaign Finance Regulations, 33 IND. L. REV. 435, 453 (2000); Redish &
Kaludis, supra note 338, at 1115 (referring to "publicly degrading experience" of
having to voice objectionable position).
357. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971), which notes "the premise
of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."
358. See Anna M. Taruschio, Note, The First Amendment, the Right Not to
Speak and the Problem of Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1001, 1019 (2000).
359. See Wasserman, supra note 15, at 191 (stating that government-
compelled expression "interferes with an individual's ability to define the
persona she presents to the world"). But see Greene, supra note 16, at 474, for
an assertion that compelled speech is not expressive if reasonable observer
"know[s] that the speech act was compelled" and that therefore "the uttered
words are not necessarily reflective of the speaker's thoughts."
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PG&E.36 ° The Hurley Court, though declining to rule
squarely on the question of misattribution, indicated that
GLIB's banner would be "perceived by spectators as part of
the whole" parade's expression."' Conversely, Court rulings
rejecting asserted violations of negative speech rights have
often disparaged the danger of misattribution. In the
Court's eyes, neither the programming that cable
broadcasters were required to transmit36 nor the petition
whose sponsors PruneYard was forced to admit363 would be
perceived as carrying the imprimatur of the plaintiff. In
other instances, however, questions of attribution appear to
have played no role in the Court's decision. Realistically, for
example, the Maynards' exemption from displaying "Live
Free or Die" on their car was not rooted in concern that
others would perceive the couple as affirmatively endorsing
the motto.3 " Indeed, the fatal defect of New Hampshire's
requirement in Wooley was its requirement that the couple's
car serve as a "mobile billboard" for the state's message. 36
Some rationales for protecting negative speech rights
suffer not from incompleteness, but rather from an opposite
problem; they are general enough to encompass a spectrum
of scenarios without supplying definite guidance. The
Hurley Court, for example, stated that upholding the
Veteran Council's exclusion of GLIB vindicated speakers'
right to autonomy over their messages.366 Though autonomy
makes for an appealing explanatory principle in such
360. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion).
361. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995); see also Friesen, supra note 185, at 632 (stating that
inherently public nature of political advocacy increases relative danger that
union's political expenditures in Abood would be associated with views of
individual members).
362. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
363. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980); see also
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997) (noting that
the generic advertisement that plaintiffs opposed subsidizing was not attributed
to them).
364. See Bezanson, supra note 44, at 1021-22; Madigan, supra note 53, at 113
("[I]f everyone's car says the same thing, it is unlikely other people will see the
motto as a product of choice or affirmation.").
365. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
366. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573, 576.
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cases,367 it can also border on the tautological. After all, any
ruling that sustains freedom from state compulsion to speak
or support unwanted messages can be said to effectuate
respect for autonomy.368 Similarly, the extent to which
compelled expression distorts the marketplace of ideas369 is
a gauge of broad relevance but limited utility. It is a
reasonable observation that the First Amendment
"prohibits the government from securing free advertising [of
preferred messages] through compulsion for the same
reason it prohibits the government from suppressing
speech: the government may not favor one message over
another in a way that disturbs the natural competition in
the marketplace of ideas."37 In particular, that marketplace
is skewed by compulsion whose effect is to artificially
magnify the degree of sujpport that the government's
message apparently enjoys. 3 IAt the same time, however,
the impact on the ideological market of particular
compulsions to voice or support ideas does not seem to
present a concrete or distinctive means of assessing their
validity.
Still other theories may offer significant contributions to
negative speech doctrine but have not been embraced by the
Court. One recent commentator has advanced the thesis
that the scope of negative speech rights can be best
understood through the perspective and interests of
367. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay, What is Really Wrong with
Compelled Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2005) ("[T]he fundamental
wrong of compelled speech ... has more to do with the illicit influence compelled
speech may have on the character and autonomous thinking process of the
compelled speaker ...."); Taruschio, supra note 358, at 1017 (characterizing the
Pacific Gas holding as "based on autonomy principles").
368. See, e.g., Post, supra note 347, at 216-17 (asserting that the ubiquity of
interest in autonomy renders it not useful as an explanatory principle in
compelled subsidization cases).
369. See Jacobs, supra note 15, at 183 ("[C]ompelled expression analysis
should look to whether the government's purpose is to manipulate the
marketplace of ideas or whether its purpose is not related to expression.").
370. Sacharoff, supra note 40, at 399 n.352.
371. See Sarabyn, supra note 354, at 410; see also Shiffrin, supra note 367, at
862 (stating that forcing people to express ideas that they do not believe
undermines the search for truth by "encourag[ing] cynicism and ambivalence
about the value of truth").
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listeners.372 Another scholar has interpreted decisions like
Prune Yard and Pacific Gas as implementing the principle of
"representation-reinforcement."37  Both ideas could
plausibly explain a decision like Abood, in which the Court
forbade the union to exert exaggerated influence on the
political system by inflating listeners' perception of its
positions' popularity among members.374 Nevertheless, the
Court's opinion was anchored in the right of objecting
members to exercise their "freedom of belief." '375
B. The Mutability of Negative Speech Doctrines
However unrealistic it is to expect a body of judicial
decisions to cohere with perfect logic, negative speech rights
have followed an unusually unsteady trajectory. Doctrinal
tensions arise in treatment of principles that transcend
specific areas as well as within those areas themselves. This
pervasive dissonance further suggests that compelled
expression appears in too many manifestations to be
usefully guided by a single conceptual framework.
A recurring example of uncertain standards is the
question of attribution. As discussed earlier, the Court has
not consistently treated the weight assigned to whether
compelled expression can be ascribed to the objector.376
Moreover, even assuming that the claimant's association
with the disputed message is a requisite element of
successful claims, the Court's decisions have varied in
evaluating the asserted connection. Contrasting approaches
can be discerned in the perspective from which this
determination is made, the capacity for disavowal of the
message, and the significance of the objector's ideological
views.
372. See Sacharoff, supra note 40, at 384-85.
373. David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1745
(1991) (describing this principle as "perfecting the processes of democratic
accountability" (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-16 (1980))).
374. See Sacharoff, supra note 40, at 334 ('"The real harm in Abood lay with
listeners and the political system because the compelled subsidies permitted the
union message to become unfairly amplified.").
375. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
376. See supra notes 358-65 and accompanying text.
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As a threshold matter, the Court has not adhered to a
single benchmark for examining the strength of the
challenger's claim of being linked to the disputed message.
When finding that the government has not violated negative
speech rights, the Court has naturally tended to apply an
objective standard of reasonableness. PruneYard furnishes
a notable instance of this mode of analysis. In determining
that "[tihe views expressed by members of the public ...
will not likely be identified with those of the owner," '377 the
Court relied principally on the shopping center's character
as a business establishment indiscriminatingly open to the
public.37 In FAIR as well, the Court measured the
possibility of attribution by considering visible
circumstances instead of the plaintiffs' subjective feelings.
According to the Court, a reasonable observer would not
perceive the presence of military recruiters on campus as
expressing a law school's approval of military policy on
homosexuality.379  Likewise, the decisions sustaining
subsidies for generic advertising were marked by brisk
assessments of whether dispassionate viewers would tie the
plaintiffs to the disputed messages. Glickman noted
conclusively that the advertising in question was
"attributed not to them, but to the California Tree Fruit
Agreement or 'California Summer Fruits,"'38 while Johanns
ruled that the tagline "Beef. It's What's for Dinner" was not
"sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable factfinder that
any particular beef producer, or all beef producers, would be
tarred with the content of the trademarked ad."38
377. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
378. See id.
379. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),
547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006); see also Carpenter, supra note 72, at 241, which
criticizes the holding but agrees that "[n]o knowledgeable observer will think
law schools endorse anti-gay discrimination simply because they must permit
military recruiters on campus or even include announcements of their presence
in emails and other notices."
380. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997).
381. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 566 (2005); see also
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOwA L. REV. 1377, 1433 (2001) ('The real question . . . should be
whether the government places a person in such a relationship with
objectionable ideas that a reasonable observer will see the ideas as that person's
own."); Gaebler, supra note 5, at 1010 ("Unless the government requires an
individual to do something which reasonably identifies him with a message it is
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Admittedly, objective analysis of attribution can also
result in finding violation of negative speech rights;3.. such
rulings, however, more typically spring from a probe of the
claimant's distinctive sentiments rather than the vantage
point of a hypothetical average person. If attribution figured
at all in Wooley, for example, it can only be because the
Court credited the Maynards' sense that they were
effectively affirming the motto "Live Free or Die."383 As
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent, the state had not
forced the couple to "communicate ideas with nonverbal
actions reasonably likened to 'speech,' such as wearing a
lapel button promoting avpolitical candidate or waving a flag
as a symbolic gesture."3 Similarly, though the mandatory
pledge in Barnette obviously did qualify as speech, there
was "scant risk" that a participant in such a ceremony
would be "understood or misunderstood as communicating
her personal patriotism or her authentic pledge of
allegiance." '385 Neither would anyone reasonably "confuse the
politician's right-of-reply op-ed with a newspaper's own
viewpoint" in Tornillo. 86
By contrast, two other decisions in favor of claimants,
Abood and Dale, present more ambiguous scenarios;
nevertheless, any role of attribution in these cases contains
strains of subjectivity. The Abood Court couched its
invalidation of compulsory dues for unions' political
activities in terms of conscience, not objecting members'
public identification with these causes.38 At the same time,
difficult to describe the government's action as compelling expression."). But see
Robert D. Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced Expression, 34 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 101, 116 (1999) ("[C]ompelled subsidization is objectionable even if there is
no identification between the contributor and the subsidized expression.").
382. Hurley's treatment of the impact of GLIB's banner on the St. Patrick's
Day parade might be cited as an example of such an outcome. The Court
pronounced it "clear," without elaboration, that "the parade's overall message"
was distilled by spectators "from the individual presentations along the way."
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 577 (1995).
383. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
384. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
385. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 433.
386. Carpenter, supra note 72, at 241.
387. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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however, impingement on dissidents' conscience can be seen
as rooted in their felt sense of projecting support for views
that they find repugnant.3 8 The intensity of opposition that
would prompt them to shelter this portion of their dues8 9
further suggests the subjective character of objectors'
association with the union's activities. As for Dale, the
Court explicitly endorsed the Boy Scouts' position that
acceptance of Dale would mean aligning the organization
with a specific stance on a public controversy. Dale's
presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to
send a message, both to the youth members and the world,
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."390 While the Court considered
objective evidence, in particular the Scouts' mission
statement,391 that evidence did not point ineluctably to the
conclusion that Dale's participation would convey a specific
message.392 Since that proposition is at least debatable, the
result reflects the substantial weight accorded to the Boy
Scouts' subjective perception of what Dale's inclusion would
signify.39 3 The Dale Court's stance on this point is also of a
piece with its broader attitude toward deference in that
case.
394
Closely related to attribution is the question of
disavowal; disclaimer of a message might mitigate an
otherwise illegitimate imposition of unwanted speech.3 95 Yet
here too the Court has displayed no readily ascertainable
general approach toward the significance of this factor. In
some instances, the Court has cited ease of disassociation as
partial grounds for rejecting a claimed violation of negative
speech rights. Thus, the PruneYard Court was satisfied that
388. See Friesen, supra note 185, at 632.
389. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
390. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
391. See supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 302-03.
393. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's
Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 46
(2009).
394. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
395. See Gaebler, supra note 5, at 1003 ("Compulsion to express a particular
view does not by itself preclude the opportunity to disavowal whatever one has
been compelled to express.").
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the shopping center's owners could "expressly disavow any
connection with the message by simply posting signs in the
area where the speakers or handbillers stand."'396 The signs
could pointedly "disclaim any sponsorship of the message
and could explain that the persons are communicating their
own messages by virtue of state law." '397 In FAIR, the Court
found law schools disturbed by any message sent by the
presence of military recruiters to be similarly equipped to
distance themselves from these implications, noting the
robust means at the schools' disposal for voicing their
disapproval of the military's message.398 When upholding
rights of negative speech, however, the Court has seemingly
disregarded challengers' ability to disavow the forced
message. New Hampshire law did not forbid the Maynards
to display a bumper sticker declaring "in no uncertain
terms" their emphatic disagreement with the sentiments
associated with the motto "Live Free or Die." '399 In Pacific
Gas as well, it is difficult to envision obstacles to PG&E's
spelling out-if it were not already self-evident-that
TURN did not speak for the utility. Even Dale may supply a
somewhat ironic example of this analytical gap. Aside from
general references in the Scouts' mission statement to its
members' staying "morally straight" and "clean,"4 ° the
Court cited only scattered evidence of the Scouts' opposition
to homosexuality.4 1 Forced acceptance of Dale under New
Jersey's law might have given the Scouts motivation and
occasion to trade this relative reticence for a full-throated
proclamation of its view.
That the Dale Court did not weigh the feasibility of a
disclaimer points to another ambiguity in the Court's
disposition of negative speech claims. Consideration of
opportunities to disavow unwanted expression in
PruneYard and FAIR implies a relatively narrow scope of
negative speech rights: viz., protection against conveying a
396. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
397. Id.
398. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.
(FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 60, 65, 69-70 (2006).
399. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
400. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649-50 (2000); see supra note 302
and accompanying text.
401. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-52.
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particular objectionable message.4"2  As Justice Powell
observed in PruneYard, however, the need for disavowal to
negate the impression of endorsement causes a different
type of compulsion. In such an instance, the property owner
"has been forced to speak when he would prefer to remain
silent . . . The mere fact that he is free to disassociate
himself from the views expressed on his property ... cannot
restore his 'right to refrain from speaking at all.""'4 3 In
quoting from Wooley's broad protection of a right not to
speak, Justice Powell invoked the more expansive terms in
which the Court has sometimes conceived the interest at
stake in such cases. It was this conception that appeared to
inform the Court's reasoning in Dale. If the Scouts wished,
stated the Court, it was entitled to instruct Scout leaders to
"avoid questions of sexuality" altogether, imparting its
views on the subject "only by example."4" Thus, the Court in
some cases has seemed to recognize a sweeping right to
remain silent on a topic, while in others condoning a
practical impetus to speak.
A larger institutional question linked to attribution is
the comparative deference extended to competing state and
private claims.4"5 The problem comes into heightened focus
in the arena of expressive association, when government
efforts to bar discriminatory access are met by claims that
admission of an excluded class of person or activity will
402. Glickman can also be understood as proceeding on this premise. While
the Court found that the advertising of California fruits was not ascribed to the
plaintiffs, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997), it
also indicated that such attribution would not have affected the outcome. In
stressing that "none of the generic advertising conveys any message with which
respondents disagree," id., the Court appeared to confine the relevant right to
avoiding expression of a distasteful view. Under this analysis, the plaintiffs
lacked a constitutionally cognizable right not to issue any pronouncements on
the topic. Id. at 472.
403. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (Powell, J.
concurring) (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714); see also Taruschio, supra note
358, at 1043 ("T]he pressure to respond is a significant intrusion on the right
not to speak; it forces someone to speak when they would rather remain silent
or run the risk of agreeing with the offending speech.").
404. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
405. See generally Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1061, 1117-39 (2008) (discussing the conflict between deference to Congress
and deference to law schools in FAIR).
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alter a group's message.4"6 Resolution of such clashes often
hinges on the deference accorded to the group's assertion of
the expressive impact of inclusion, or to the government's
contention that its measure is necessary to achieve a
weighty purpose. In this area as well, the Court has not
unswervingly followed a clearly articulated course.
Ironically, the Court's most definite pronouncement on
deference states principles to which the Court has not
generally adhered. As noted earlier, Dale proclaimed a
doctrine of deference to both an association's assertion of
the substance of its message and its view of conditions for
preserving that expression.4 7 Such deference, however,
especially on the question of what would undermine
existing values, is hardly evident in other major decisions.
The Roberts Court dismissed out of hand the Jaycees'
position that admission of women was likely to affect the
organization's mission of promoting the interests and
development of young men."' Likewise, the Court rejected
the notion-even if bolstered by statistical support-that
different outlooks between men and women generally could
prompt changes in the Jaycees' positions on public issues.4 9
In CLS, the Court not only declined an arguably natural
application of Dale's deference,4" ' but also opined that CLS's
406. For a suggestion that an intermediate level of deference may be
appropriate in this context, see Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless:
Public University Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student
Organizations, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2882, 2887 (2005) (noting that unlimited
deference could enable wholesale exemption from antidiscrimination policies,
but that absence of deference could force groups that "genuinely desire to
associate to express disfavored ideas" to admit nonadherents).
407. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text; see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 78, at 275 ("[T]he Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale essentially
held that a group could define its own expressive message during litigation.").
408. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) ('There is ...
no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting
members will impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected
activities or to disseminate its preferred views."). In contrast, the Court of
Appeals had thought it "natural to expect that an association containing both
men and women will not be so single-minded about advancing men's interests as
an association of men only." U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571 (8th
Cir. 1983).
409. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
410. See Christian A. Malanga, Note, Expressive Association-Student
Organizations' Right to Discriminate: A Look at Public Law Schools'
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fear of being overwhelmed by members not sharing its
values "strikes us as more hypothetical than real."4t
Perhaps most vividly, FAIR's skepticism toward law schools'
resistance to military recruiters41 displayed scant deference
to "an association's view of what would impair its
expression.""4 3
Conversely, Roberts, FAIR, and CLS exhibit deference
toward the government's view on the importance of its
measure-a deference that is conspicuously absent from
Dale. Even applying strict scrutiny, the Roberts Court
accepted Minnesota's judgment that its interest in halting
discrimination justified major intrusion into the Jaycees'
associational freedom.4 In FAIR, the Court deferred to the
military and Congress on what it regarded as essentially a
matter of military policy. 5 Unlike Roberts and FAIR, CLS
did not involve a legislative determination to which the
Court might defer, and the Court recited the truism that
"we owe no deference to universities when we consider"
whether a university has transgressed constitutional
limitations. 6 Nevertheless, the Court took pains to voice
humility in reviewing Hastings' all-comers policy, noting
that judges "lack the on-the-ground expertise and
experience of school administrators.""7  Ultimately, the
Nondiscrimination Policies and Their Application to Christian Legal Society
Student Chapters, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 777 (2007) (stating, prior to the
Court's holding in CLS, that "[b]ecause the Court found that including James
Dale as a member would significantly affect the Scouts' ability to project its
viewpoint, it seems logical that a court analyzing the CLS's claim would find
that including a homosexual would similarly inhibit the CLS's ability to express
its viewpoints").
411. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2992 (2010).
412. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
413. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000); Carpenter, supra
note 72, at 252 ("Rather than deferring to the law schools about what impairs
their expression, the Court almost mocks their claims."); Paul Horwitz,
Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1553 (2007) (arguing that the Court "paid lip
service, at best," to the concept of deference to expressive associations).
414. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
415. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.
(FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 58-59 (2006); see also Horwitz, supra note 406, at 1553.
416. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2988.
417. Id.
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Court's approval of that policy proceeded from a philosophy
that cautioned courts against "substitut[ing] their own
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school
authorities which they review."'418
Finally, perhaps nowhere is the Court's checkered
analysis in addressing problems of negative speech rights
more glaring than in the generic advertising cases. As
discussed earlier, commentators have accused the Court of
thoroughgoing inconsistency in its disposition of the
Glickman-United Foods-Johanns trilogy.4 ' Even observers
who find the decisions reconcilable tend to defend their
collective meaning in guarded terms.42 ° In a sense, then, the
Court's inability to present a persuasive account of its
reasoning in this fairly discrete field represents a
microcosm of the flagging broader enterprise of negative
speech rights.
III. INDICIA OF SUBORDINATION
The formal notion of a broad and co-equal right against
compelled speech has obscured the fragility of negative
speech rights in practice. Indeed, it is questionable whether
the core right to refrain from speaking proclaimed in
Barnette has a substantial independent existence. Rather, it
418. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).
419. See supra Part I.D.3.; see also Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First
Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing to
Say?, 95 IowA L. REV. 1259, 1292 (2010) (finding beef marketing program in
Johanns indistinguishable from mushroom program in United Foods "[f]rom a
First Amendment perspective"); Sullivan & Post, supra note 161, at 370
(statement of Sullivan) ("[T]he trilogy . . .reveals the most frightening internal
theoretical incoherence about why commercial speech should receive
constitutional protection and about what kind of protection it should receive.").
But see Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159, 179-
80 (2009) (concluding that differences in outcomes in United Foods and
Glickman can be explained by distinction between factual statements and
assertions of belief).
420. See, e.g., Mark Champoux, Recent Case, Uncovering Coherence in
Compelled Subsidy of Speech Doctrine: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,
125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005), 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1107, 1113 n.48 (2006) ("[Ihe
view adopted in this Comment seeks simply to illuminate the possibility of
coherence, even if narrow, in the Court's jurisprudence.").
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appears that negative speech rights receive robust
protection primarily when tethered to another interest of
constitutional character. In addition, negative speech claims
have been repeatedly rejected on the ground that a separate
conceptual framework supersedes the claim. Further
indicating the vulnerability of negative speech rights, the
Court has allowed even acknowledged infringements of
these rights where the state can plausibly portray its
interest as advancing other constitutional values. These
patterns of subordination, intertwined with the area's lack
of theoretical coherence, bode ill for assertions of negative
rights against emerging forms of compelled speech.
A. Special Protection for "Hybrid" Claims
Successful assertions of negative speech rights have
generally involved, at least tacitly, the presence of other
constitutional norms. This pattern suggests that challenges
to compelled speech, in isolation, have less force than
comparable claims of affirmative speech rights. Rather,
negative speech rights appear to draw strength largely from
combination with separate constitutionally cognizable
interests. The dependence on "hybrid" conditions for a
right's potency has precedent in the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence, where the Court tolerated a disjunction
between its doctrine and outcomes before formally
announcing a less protective regime. In Employment
Division v. Smith,42 ' the Court discarded the standard of
strict scrutiny for free exercise claims it had announced
twenty-seven years earlier422 and preserved in later cases
even while repeatedly rejecting such claims.423 Instead, the
Court declared that it would align principle with practice by
421. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
422. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("[A]ny incidental
burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a
'compelling state interest .... "'(citation omitted)).
423. This line of cases included both decisions in which the government
restriction was deemed to satisfy the Sherbert test, see, e.g., United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982) (rejecting claim for religious exemption from
participation in social security system on ground that "mandatory participation
is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system"), and those in
which the Court found the test inapplicable, see, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (stating that the Sherbert test does not apply to free
exercise claim for exemption from general rule in military setting).
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permitting enforcement of valid "generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct" to religiously
motivated instances of that conduct.424 Other than in the
now-particularized circumstance of Sherbert itself,425 the
Court would apply the "compelling interest" test only in
"hybrid situation[s]" where the Free Exercise Clause
operated "in conjunction with other constitutional
protections." '426  According to the Court, this approach
explained past invalidations of regulations that impinged
not only on free exercise, but also on rights like free speech
or substantive due process.427
Admittedly, Smith's requisite for applying strict scrutiny
to free exercise claims furnishes an imperfect analogy to the
theory of negative speech rights as reliant on additional
rights for their potency. The decision has been variously
criticized as disingenuous,428  unclear,429  and
424. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
425. The Court observed that the eligibility criteria of unemployment
compensation programs "invite consideration of the particular circumstances
behind an applicant's unemployment." Id. at 884.
426. Id. at 881-82.
427. Id. at 881. The Court cited as examples, inter alia, Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), which struck down a licensing scheme for
religious and charitable solicitations that authorized the administrator had
discretion to withhold license for nonreligious causes, and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), which invalidated enforcement of compulsory school-
attendance laws to Amish parents who for religious reasons refused to send
their children to school beyond the eighth grade. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
428. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Correspondence, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) (asserting the
Smith decision's "use of precedent borders on fiction"); Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1124
(1990) (stating that the apparent purpose of Smith's discussion of hybrid cases
was "to enable the Court to reach the conclusion it desired ... without openly
overruling any prior decisions").
429. See Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious
Exemptions, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1498-1508 (2010) (describing the variety of
approaches that lower courts have used to interpret hybrid situation doctrine);
see also Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance
and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence,
71 TEx. L. REV. 833, 862 (1993) (stating that there can be "no doubt" about the
'lack of coherent protection" under the hybrid doctrine).
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underprotective,43 ° and the Smith Court did retain strict
scrutiny for those unusual laws that specifically target a
religious practice.43 Still, the holding shows the Court's
receptivity to allowing certain constitutional rights to offer
slender protection unless bolstered by other forms of
constitutional liberty. In the case of negative speech rights,
this dynamic appears to operate with special force when
compelled expression carries the risk of operating as a
restriction of speech as well. The Riley Court's rejection of
North Carolina's disclosure requirement for fundraisers432 is
especially instructive. Compared to clashes with beliefs
entailed by the compulsions in Barnette, Wooley, and
Tornillo, the mandated report of data in Riley represented a
modest intrusion on speech prerogatives.433 The Court,
however, was disturbed by the statute's potential to
suppress speech: "[I]f the potential donor is unhappy with
the disclosed percentage, the fundraiser will not likely be
given a chance to explain the figure; the disclosure will be
the last words spoken as the donor closes the door or hangs
up the phone." '434  Tornillo and Pacific Gas similarly
displayed concern that state directives serving as vehicles
for others' speech would dampen the plaintiffs' own
expression. Noting the deterrent to treatment of
controversial issues produced by Florida's right of reply
statute, the Tornillo Court predicted that "political and
electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced." '435 Justice
Powell's plurality opinion in Pacific Gas likewise
condemned the potential chilling effect of the Commission's
430. See, e.g., John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free
Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71, 102-03 (1991)
(arguing that Smith subordinates the Free Exercise Clause to the government's
interest in criminal enforcement); McConnell, supra note 428, at 1152-53
(arguing that Smith undermines the protection afforded to minority religions by
the Free Exercise Clause).
431. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
432. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
433. See Wright, supra note 175, at 494.
434. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988).
435. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974). See also
TRIBE, supra note 329, at 1002, which characterizes the Tornillo Court as
having recognized that "the power to compel speech comes too close to the power
to censor speech."
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order for PG&E to include TURN's newsletter in its billing
envelope. 36 To avoid the order's triggering mechanism,"'
PG&E might well "avoid controversy"8 and "limit its own
speech";439 as a practical matter, then, the order tended to
"inhibit expression of appellant's views."' 0
Constraints on expression can also be discerned in other
cases where the Court has sustained claims of negative
speech rights. In upholding rights of expressive association,
for example, the Court has determined that forcing the
association to include the speech in question would impair
its ability to express its view. In Hurley, display of GLIB's
banner in the St. Patrick's Day parade would have not only
foisted on the Veterans Council a message opposed by the
group. It would also have "alter[ed] the message"" that the
association sought to convey through this expressive
activity, and thus undermined the effectiveness of the
Council's own speech. For the Dale Court, too, the First
Amendment right of exclusion was bound up with the
organization's freedom from restraints on its expression.
The Court described its ruling that the Boy Scouts could
deny membership to Dale as "protect[ing] the First
Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different
view.""2
Some decisions can be understood as more subtly
signaling heightened scrutiny of compelled expression that
may stifle speech as well. In Abood, the expenditure of
required service fees on political activities effectively
diverted resources from objectors' favored causes to ones
that they opposed." 3 From this zero-sum-game perspective,
mandated contributions to fund dissemination of repugnant
436. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion).
437. See id. (noting that access was granted "only to those who disagree with
appellant's views").
438. Id. (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257).
439. Id. at 11 n.7.
440. Id. at 20.
441. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995).
442. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000).
443. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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views diminish objectors' own speech. Even where objectors
do not intend to allocate the challenged dues to political
aims, extraction of fees to support a hostile agenda shrinks
their relative voice in the political process. Additionally, in
the case of commercial disclosure requirements, the Court
has suggested that its tolerance for compelled information
will end where a significant restraint on advertisers' speech
begins. While upholding Ohio's mandatory disclosure
requirement in Zauderer,' the Court cautioned that
"unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements
might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
commercial speech."" Similarly, the Court's approval of the
challenged provisions in Milavetz"6 was premised on their
"impos[ing] a disclosure requirement rather than an
affirmative limitation on speech."" 7
Nor are affirmative speech rights the only
complementary constitutional interests that can be detected
in cases where the Court has ruled compelled speech
invalid. Though the Court has not invoked the Takings
Clause' in sustaining negative speech claims, the interest
in property safeguarded by that provision has colored a
number of such decisions. Both the Wooley and Pacific Gas
Courts couched their reasoning in terms of the state's
improper appropriation of the claimant's property. Wooley
barred the state from "requir[ing] an individual to
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message
by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for
the express purpose that it be observed and read by the
public." ' 9 In Pacific Gas, the access order was deemed to
require PG&E to "to use its property as a vehicle for
spreading a message with which it disagrees. 45 ° Moreover,
444. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
445. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(emphasis added).
446. See supra notes 3-4, 162-63 and accompanying text.
447. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339
(2010).
448. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
449. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
450. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion); id. at 17-18 ("[T]he Commission's order requires appellant
to use its property-the billing envelopes-to distribute the message of
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Abood-and by extension Keller and even United Foods-
embodies a rejection of government's deprivation of property
usually associated with takings jurisprudence.4 5 ' In a sense,
Abood's distinction between permissible and forbidden
mandatory dues mirrors the line drawn in takings doctrine.
Compulsory fees for "germane" activities are repaid through
the benefits of collective bargaining, much like the
advantages that those subjected to restrictions on using
their property receive from the overall regulatory scheme.'
Conversely, forced subsidization of disagreeable views
resembles restrictions that deplete one's property without
compensation or offsetting benefits.453 Finally (if more
speculatively), even the Court's resolution of expressive
association claims can be viewed as entailing considerations
of property. Richard Epstein has argued that associational
rights derive not only from free speech, but also from
"liberty and property as ordinarily conceived." '454
Accordingly, antidiscrimination laws should overcome
exclusionary preferences "only in those cases where claims
for freedom of association are asserted by firms or
institutions that occupy some monopoly position."'455 From
this perspective, one might distinguish Dale from Roberts
on the basis of the Jaycees' quasi-monopolistic position as a
forum for business networking.456
another."); see Yassky, supra note 373, at 1739 ("[The PG&E interest vindicated
by the Pacific Gas Court seems remarkably similar to a property right.").
451. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164
(1980); see also infra note 448 and accompanying text.
452. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
(1987) ("While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in
turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others."); Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (referring to "an average reciprocity of
advantage").
453. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982) (finding compensable taking where a state required the owner of an
apartment building to allow a cable company to affix a cable to its building).
454. Epstein, supra note 310, at 120.
455. Id. at 121.
456. See William Buss, Discrimination by Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 815,
850 (1989) ("[In connection with Roberts, the] most well established ground for
denying an association the right to select its members is the elimination of the
economic harm that results from excluding disfavored groups."); Michael W.
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 46
2011] 919
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Another constitutional norm that may infuse negative
speech rights with requisite vitality is freedom of the press.
While the Court has denied that the Free Press Clause4. 7
confers distinctive rights on the institutional media,458 it has
indicated special solicitude for the function that they
traditionally perform.4 9 Here the analogy to free exercise
hybrid rights seems especially apt. The Court in Smith
described the result in Wisconsin v. Yoder,46° upholding
Amish parents' refusal to send their children to school
beyond the eighth grade, as not resting on the Free Exercise
Clause alone; rather, the Yoders' rights also derived from
the liberty of parents to direct the education of their
children recognized in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.46 ' At the
same time, the Yoder opinion by its own terms did not apply
to similar claims based on "secular values" instead of a
"religious basis." '462  Thus, the notion of hybrid rights
represented by Yoder can be seen as operating
synergistically, with two constitutional values forging a
privilege that neither alone could support. Similarly, even
though the Free Press Clause lacks separate enforceability,
its values may add decisive weight to some negative speech
claims. Thus, the Court highlighted the "intrusion into the
function of editors" effected by the right of reply statute in
(2000) ("[B]ecause Jaycees was essentially a business networking organization,
the state may [have had] a stronger than usual interest in regulating the
Jaycees in order to ensure equal access to economic opportunity.").
457. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the
freedom ... of the press . ").
458. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978) ("[Tihe press
does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to
enlighten."); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (rejecting greater access
to prisons or inmates than the general public); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 705 (1972) ("The informative function [of organized press] is also
performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and
dramatists.").
459. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88, 587 n.3
(1980); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
460. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
461. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)
(applying Pierce).
462. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
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Tornillo463 and found in Pacific Gas that the concerns
underlying its invalidation of that statute applied to PG&E
"as well as to the institutional press."4M
Ultimately, the idea that negative speech rights draw
potency from hybrid conditions raises the question of
whether Barnette-the original source of these rights, cited
by the Court as an exemplar of "true 'compelled-speech'
cases"465 -can be viewed in this light. At a minimum, it can
be said that the right to refrain from speaking was not the
only constitutional interest discernable in the case. As in
other instances noted above, the State's compulsion to
engage in expression effectively restrained speech as well.
Refusal to salute the flag or pledge allegiance here
represented symbolic protest,466 and state insistence on
conformity amounted to suppression of that dissent.467
Realistically, moreover, the dissenting students were acting
at the direction of their parents, whose values were
reflected in this conduct. 468 At least obliquely, then, Barnette
incorporates tenets from a pair of cases decided two decades
earlier. Declaring that "[t]he child is not the mere creature
of the State, 469 the Court in Pierce acknowledged that the
substantive liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause includes the right of
parents to "direct the upbringing and education of [their]
children. 470 Oregon had unduly interfered with that liberty
by forcing parents who wished to send their children to
private schools to enroll them in public schools instead.47'
463. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
464. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion).
465. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005).
466. See Gaebler, supra note 5, at 998.
467. See Gey, supra note 419, at 1265-66 ("[Slince the Pledge was originally
conceived as a government assertion of uniformity and solidarity, any dissent
from the Pledge would undercut the central meaning of the government's
message." (footnote omitted)).
468. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943)
(noting the prosecution of parents of children who refuse to participate in flag
salute ceremony "for causing delinquency").
469. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
470. Id. at 534-35.
471. Id.
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Similarly, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska472 invoked the due
process right to "establish a home and bring up children"473
to strike down a prohibition on teaching languages other
than English. Thus, Barnette's holding thwarted
encroachment on this type of liberty by forbidding West
Virginia to "prescribe what shall be orthodox '474 in the
beliefs that parents instill in their children.
B. Compelled Speech as a Secondary Classification
While successful negative speech claims typically
present hybrid circumstances, failed claims often result
from the Court's framing the issue such that compelled
speech is not the decisive perspective. In these cases, the
Court has analyzed the dispute through the lens of a
different category in which negative speech rights are
implicated only incidentally or not at all. The susceptibility
of compelled speech claims to re-characterization further
underscores the relative weakness of their underlying
doctrine.
Perhaps the most notable instance of this phenomenon
is the Court's dismissal of beef producers' claim in
Johanns.475 In ruling that the promotional campaign in
question constituted government expression, the Court
short-circuited the producers' theory of compelled speech. Of
course check-off programs for industry-wide advertising are
not the only setting in which the Court has invoked
government speech doctrine to deflect First Amendment
challenges. Johanns's pronouncement that "the
Government's own speech . . . is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny' 76 stated a familiar principle.477 The
472. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
473. Id. at 399.
474. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
475. See supra notes 264-80 and accompanying text.
476. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
477. See EUGENE VOLoKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 410 (3d ed. 2008) ('The government
has largely unlimited power to control what is said in its official organs ... or in
organs that it officially endorses, even if this control is exercised in a viewpoint-
based way."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 381, at 1380 ("[I]n representative
democracies . . . governments' speech must consist not just of information but
also of explanation, persuasion, and justification."). See generally Abner S.
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modern version of the doctrine originated in Rust v.
Sullivan,478 where the Court upheld federal regulations
barring recipients of federal funds from providing
counseling or information that could encourage abortion. 4"
The Court reasoned that "when the Government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program."4 ° A decade
later, the Court explained that "viewpoint-based funding
decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker ... or instances, like Rust,
in which the government 'used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program.'
481
Substantial criticism of its approach notwithstanding,482 the
Court recently affirmed that government actions in support
of its own policies lie outside the purview of the Free Speech
Clause 483
Whatever the breadth of its application, however, the
government speech doctrine has special potential to defeat
negative speech claims against compelled subsidies.484
Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that
government should engage in expression to promote public good).
478. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
479. See id. at 179-80 (describing regulations at issue).
480. Id. at 194.
481. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
482. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 419, at 1259-60 (criticizing the Court's
"increasingly expansive conception of government speech" and proposing that
the Court "could eliminate the government speech doctrine entirely without
harming a single one of the government's legitimate objectives"); see also Corbin,
supra note 276 (proposing the Court's recognition of mixed speech as an
alternative to the current dichotomy of private and governmental speech).
483. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) ("[T]he
Free Speech Clause] restricts government regulation of private speech; it does
not regulate government speech."). The Court characterized a privately donated
monument to a public park as government speech and therefore immune from
challenge under the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1129; see also Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ('We hold that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes.").
484. See generally Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled
Speech and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2411 (2004)
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Indeed, the implications of the doctrine were intimated even
as the Court struck down mandatory assessments for
mushroom advertising in United Foods."' There, the Court
rejected the government speech defense not because it
would inevitably fail, but because the government had not
raised it in a timely manner.4"6 Squarely presented with the
argument in Johanns, the Court embraced a "generous and
encompassing definition"4 7 of government speech that could
shield a range of forced subsidies from First Amendment
challenge. Moreover, while the Court in Southworth did not
rest its approval of the student activity fee on the
government speech doctrine,4 8 it has indicated there and
elsewhere that even a core First Amendment tenet like the
proscription of viewpoint discrimination will yield to a
determination that the message is a university's own.8 9
Thus, expansive notions of government speech and staunch
immunity for its content augur poorly for many objectors to
forced support for offending speech.
The Southworth opinion also incorporated another
doctrine with the capacity to trump otherwise plausible
assertions of negative speech rights: the idea of the public
forum. The Court referred to its earlier decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia, which had characterized a university's student
activities fund as a "metaphysical" public forum governed
by the same principles as physical ones.49  Though
Rosenberger had ruled and Southworth affirmed that
funding decisions must observe viewpoint neutrality,492
Southworth's outcome demonstrates how the public forum
(proposing to modify categorical immunity for government speech by importing
germaneness principle).
485. See supra notes 253-63 and accompanying text.
486. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416-17 (2000).
487. Post, supra note 240, at 556.
488. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (1999).
489. See id. at 235; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 834 (1995) ("A holding that the University may not discriminate based
on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict
the University's own speech, which is controlled by different principles.").
490. 515 U.S. at 833.
491. Id. at 830.
492. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841).
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concept can preempt negative speech claims. In effect, the
university's policy of creating a forum through which
students could "engage in dynamic discussions . . . outside
the lecture hall"'493 overrode the plaintiffs' interest in
avoiding payment funding expression that they opposed.
A more explicit illustration of public forum doctrine's
power to submerge negative speech theory appears in CLS.
The announcement that "our limited-public-forum
precedents supply the appropriate framework" '494  for
assessing CLS's claim placed the organization in a
precarious position. Those precedents had established a
lenient regime for judging selective access to public property
receiving this designation.495 Thus, the Court would rule
only on the "permissibility" of Hastings' nondiscrimination
policy, not its "advisability."'496 Under this standard, the
policy could be "rationally" regarded as advancing the
school's aims of "development of conflict-resolution skills,
toleration, and readiness to find common ground." '497
Moreover, by viewing the dispute through the prism of a
limited public forum, the Court transformed the nature of
CLS's claim; rather than resisting encroachment, the
association was seeking "what is effectively a state
subsidy." '498
Nor have specific doctrinal devices like government
speech and public forum been the only means by which the
Court has diluted or diverted negative speech claims. In a
number of cases, the Court has emphasized the commercial
or economic aspect of the government's interest to diminish
the claimant's stake in expression. Glickman's approval of
mandatory fees to fund advertising of summer fruits499
provides a salient example. At the outset of its analysis, the
Court posed a stark dichotomy: "The legal question that we
493. Id.
494. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010).
495. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
496. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2992.
497. Id. at 2990.
498. Id. at 2986; see also id. at 2978 ("The First Amendment shields CLS
against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity .... But CLS
enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.").
499. See supra notes 241-52 and accompanying text.
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address is whether being compelled to fund this advertising
raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather
is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the
Executive to resolve."5 °0 The opinion repeatedly assumes
this binary choice. Thus, the Court declined to distinguish
the advertising program from other features of the
marketing orders that "arguably disadvantage particular
producers for the benefit of the entire market."''
Understood in this light, the program did not infringe on
First Amendment values; it imposed "no restraint on the
freedom of any producer to communicate any message to
any audience," nor did it "compel any person to engage in
any actual or symbolic speech." ' 2 Ultimately, the Court
determined that the marketing program amounted to no
more than "a species of economic regulation" and therefore
deserved "the same strong presumption of validity that we
accord to other policy judgments made by Congress."503
In spurning other assertions of negative rights as well,
the Court has sometimes seen the crucial dynamic as
adjustment of economic forces rather than solicitude for
speech. The decision in Turner 11 to sustain Congress's
must-carry rules5" rests on such a premise: "Judgments
about how competing economic interests are to be reconciled
in the complex and fast-changing field of television are for
Congress to make. Those judgments 'cannot be ignored or
undervalued simply because [appellants] cas[t] [their]
claims under the umbrella of the First Amendment. 501
Proceeding on this principle, the Court declined to "infringe
on traditional legislative authority to make predictive
judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy. 50 6 A
similar philosophy of deference to legislative regulatory
prerogative informs the Abood line of cases.0 7 In sustaining
500. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 468 (1996).
501. Id. at 474.
502. Id. at 469; id. at 469-70 ("[The advertising program did] not compel the
producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views.").
503. Id. at 477.
504. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
505. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973)).
506. Id. at 196.
507. See supra notes 177-217 and accompanying text.
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mandatory fees to fund activities germane to collective
bargaining, the Abood Court weighed dissenters' ideological
objections in the context of "the legislative assessment of
the important contribution of the union shop to the system
of labor relations established by Congress."5 °8 Likewise,
compulsory dues to an integrated bar in Keller were
justified by "the State's interest in regulating the legal
profession and improving the quality of legal services, "509
and in assuring that lawyers "pay a fair share of the cost"51
of the system from which they benefit.
Even where compelled expression is unequivocally at
issue, its commercial context can furnish grounds for lesser
protection of negative speech rights. As discussed earlier,
the Court has adopted a lenient approach toward required
disclosures that plausibly promote the accuracy of
information received by consumers.51 This latitude stands
out not only for its contrast to the political sphere, where it
is axiomatic that candidates could not be required to supply
information assuring the truth of their promises;5"2 within
the realm of commercial speech itself, the Court has
steadily raised its scrutiny of restrictions over the course of
the past several decades." 3 This two-track approach-
including a broad conception of "purely factual and
uncontroversial information"5"4 that the state may insert
508. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
509. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
510. Id. at 12.
511. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
512. See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory,
74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 386 (1979) ("A political candidate knows the truth about
his own past and his present intentions, yet misrepresentations on these
subjects are immune from state regulation."). But see Stephen D. Sencer, Note,
Read My Lips: Examining the Legal Implications of Knowingly False Campaign
Promises, 90 MICH. L. REV. 428 (1991) (suggesting possibility of legal deterrence
to knowingly false campaign promises).
513. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.
821, 887 (2008); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium-
Specific Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 259, 282 (2007).
514. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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into advertising ---offers a striking divergence in attitudes
toward affirmative and negative speech rights.
Finally, outside of commercial speech, a frequent motif
in denials of compelled speech claims is disparagement of
the notion that such speech appears in any appreciable
degree. Though of course the Court has not banished the
right to refrain from speaking from First Amendment
protection,516 the threshold for recognition of its presence
seems high. As noted above, the Glickman Court refused to
concede that the required assessments for generic
advertising implicated the plaintiffs' negative speech
rights."7 In one telling passage, the Court bluntly declared
that "[o]ur compelled speech case law . . . is clearly
inapplicable" to the check-off program, because the
plaintiffs "are not required themselves to speak, but are
merely required to make contributions for advertising."5"8
Before validating Congress's must-carry rules in Turner II,
the Court in Turner I minimized their impact on cable
operators' expression. Far from "influenc[ing] an operator's
agenda,"5"9 the rules merely required operators to serve as a
passive "conduit" for the programming of others.52 ° In the
very different setting of FAIR, the Court similarly dismissed
the contention that law schools' expression was affected by
forced facilitation of military recruitment. On the contrary,
the Solomon Amendment "regulates conduct, not speech"; it
"affects what law schools must do ... not what they may or
may not say."52' Accordingly, a law school's accommodation
of recruiters' message "is not compelled speech because the
accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any
515. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
516. For an example of wholesale exclusion from First Amendment
recognition, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), stating that it "has
been categorically settled ... that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment."
517. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
518. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997).
519. Thrner I, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (quoting Daniel Brenner, Cable
Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DuKE L.J. 329, 379).
520. Id.
521. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAR),
547 U.S. 47, 60 (2005).
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message of the school." '522 This perception of the statute's
negligible impact on speech thus promoted the Court's
disposition of the case as centrally about deference to
military policy.'
C. The Dominance of Countervailing Norms
In a number of cases, the Court has allowed compromise
of negative speech rights where government compulsion
fosters values embodied by a constitutional guarantee.
Under this calculus, the state's interest in cultivating a
constitutional norm outweighs the individual's stake in
avoiding certain expression. This pattern further suggests a
tolerance for imposing speech at variance with more
skeptical attitudes toward restraints on speakers.
An interest repeatedly enlisted to override negative
speech claims is dissemination of diverse information and
ideas. Promotion of diverse expression represents a core
goal of the First Amendment, 524 and one enclave the Court
has recognized as a special incubator of unimpeded
discussion is the university.5 25  Upholding the student
activity fee in Southworth, the Court gave emphatic voice to
this idea. The opinion stressed that the fee's "sole purpose"
was "facilitating the free and open exchange of ideas by, and
among, [the university's] students. 526  Thus, the fee's
admitted infringement on speech was justified by "the
important and substantial purposes of the University,
522. Id. at 64.
523. See id. at 58 ("'[J]udicial deference ...is at its apogee' when Congress
legislates under its authority to raise and support armies." (quoting Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981))); John F. O'Connor, Statistics and the Military
Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor Lichtman, 66 MD. L. REV. 668, 705
(2007) ("[The Court] invoked the military deference doctrine as its first step in
constitutional analysis.").
524. See supra note 325 and accompanying text; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEMS OF FREE SPEECH 241-52
(1993).
525. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) ('The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident.").
526. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
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which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech." '527
Additionally, the Court's CLS opinion sustaining
application of Hastings' all-comers policy carries overtones
of this conception of the university's mission. The Court
launched its inquiry by observing that the association's
claims "must be analyzed in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment."528 In this context,
the law school was entitled to act on the premise that the
"educational experience is best promoted" by equal access to
organization receiving RSO status.529
In some instances, government alignment with First
Amendment aims has justified compelled access to media.
Indeed, this theme pervades the Court's opinion in Red
Lion. Rebuffing broadcasters' challenge to the fairness
doctrine,53 the Court declared that it "enhance[s] rather
than abridge[s] the freedoms of speech and press protected
by the First Amendment.""53 Requiring broadcasters to
present "representative community views" on issues of
public concern was "consistent with the ends and purposes"
of the provisions protecting these freedoms.532 Mandating
opportunity to respond for persons attacked and candidates
opposed on the air was likewise consistent with "the First
Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of
conducting its own affairs."533 More broadly, preventing
monopolization of a communications medium served "the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail."'534 For this marketplace to flourish, the public's
right to "receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences" '535  must be
527. Id. at 231.
528. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010)
(quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981)).
529. Id. at 2989 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 32, CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 1513023 at *32).
530. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
531. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
532. Id. at 394.
533. Id. at 392.
534. Id. at 390.
535. Id.
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preserved. The fairness doctrine, then, stimulated the free
flow of expression envisioned by the First Amendment.
The Court's validation of Congress's must-carry rules in
Turner, as well, was marked by recognition of their
congruence with First Amendment purposes. In Turner I,
the Court stood the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge
on its head: "The First Amendment's command that
government not impede the freedom of speech does not
disable the government from taking steps to ensure that
private interests not restrict ... the free flow of information
and ideas." '536 Congress could therefore encourage that flow
by preventing cable operators from "silenc[ing] the voice of
competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch." '537 Thus,
a central goal of the legislation-as with the Free Speech
Clause-was "promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources." ''
That goal was also advanced by California's required
access to shopping centers in PruneYard. On the surface,
the California Supreme Court's opinion construing state
law539 and the Court's decision upholding it were couched in
narrow doctrinal terms.54 ° The State's insistence on access
for expressive activity, however, tacitly acknowledged that
shopping centers had largely supplanted city streets as "the
foremost places for the dissemination of ideas and views,
often on controversial issues of political or social
significance."54 ' Increasing the public's exposure to varied
opinion therefore furthered both instrumental and
democratic rationales for freedom of speech. Some state
536. Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1993).
537. Id. at 656.
538. Id. at 662.
539. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), affd,
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
540. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (noting
distinctions from Wooley); Robins, 592 P.2d at 346-48.
541. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping
Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1999)
(offering characterization as general observation, not endorsement of specific
result in Prune Yard).
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supreme courts have explicitly recognized the free speech
values served by the right of access found in state law."
Nor is free expression the only constitutional norm on
which the state may draw to overcome negative speech
rights. Equal protection values may help to explain
resolution of clashes between antidiscrimination laws and
expressive association. In Roberts, the Court cited
Minnesota's "compelling interest" in eradicating "invidious"
gender discrimination to sustain application of state law to
end the Jaycees' exclusion of women.543 The nature of that
interest shares the purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause.5" In reviewing the government's own gender-based
classifications, the Court has required demonstration of an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for such action.545 This
demanding standard stems from "our Nation['s] .. . long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination." 46 Thus,
Minnesota's effort to curtail private gender discrimination
paralleled the Constitution's constraints on public forms of
that conduct. By contrast, comparably forceful descriptions
of the state's interest are conspicuously absent from the
Court's opinion in Dale.547 Like Minnesota, New Jersey
542. See, e.g., Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Colo. 1991);
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 593-94 (Mass. 1983); N.J.
Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760-
61 (N.J. 1994); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387-88 (Pa. 1981);
Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 114-17 (Wash. 1981).
543. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 628 (1984).
544. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.").
545. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). In United States v. Virginia, the
Court struck down a male-only admissions policy at the Virginia Military
Institute after finding that Virginia had failed to show an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for the policy. Id. at 534. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (barring the use of gender-based preemptory
challenges); Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724, 731 (invalidating
admissions policy prohibiting males from enrolling in state-supported nursing
school). The Court has reserved the question of whether classifications based on
gender are "inherently suspect." See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.6.
546. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
547. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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sought to bar discrimination, but based on homosexuality
rather than gender.548 It may be that here, too, the Court's
reasoning reflected a congruence between equal protection
jurisprudence and state power. Though the Court has twice
struck down laws aimed at homosexuality,549  it has
pointedly declined to characterize homosexuality as a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification.55 ° Therefore, while
New Jersey had a valid interest in curbing discrimination
based on sexual orientation, the Court may have regarded
that interest as less weighty than the state interest in
Roberts, and calibrated its analysis accordingly. Indeed, it
seems unlikely that the Court would adopt such a
deferential stance toward a group's representations where a
state sought to ban racial discrimination-conduct that,
when engaged in by government, triggers the strictest
scrutiny under equal protection.5 '
CONCLUSION
The concept of negative speech rights has more
descriptive than normative value. Like restraints on speech,
government directives plausibly labeled "compelled speech"
can assume multifarious forms triggering an array of
considerations. The pretense that these requirements are
all governed by a single principle emanating from Barnette
has aggravated the area's chronic uncertainty. In
particular, doctrinal incoherence has obscured and fostered
the vulnerability of negative speech rights.
The disjunction between the formal potency of rights
not to speak and their practical weakness is not merely an
academic matter. Government actions routinely test public
548. See id.
549. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)) (striking down a statute criminalizing certain sexual
conduct between members of the same sex); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment forbidding state entities
from adopting a prohibition of discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation).
550. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 628-32; Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcizing the Ghosts
of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519,
521 (2009).
551. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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power to force citizens to express, support, or facilitate the
messages of others. The school setting alone has generated
a number of these issues: e.g., whether a student in an
acting class must recite profanity that offends her beliefs,552
whether a teacher must engage in expression prescribed by
the curriculum that clashes with her views, 5 ' whether a
principal may condition a student's receipt of her diploma
upon a prescribed apology for a comment made in her
graduation speech,554 and whether teachers can be required
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.5 5 In the realm of criminal
law, probation conditions that compel defendants publicly to
declare their guilt 56 or to apologize 557 also impinge on
552. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004)
(upholding a school's authority to require recitation of offending language as
long as the decision was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"
(quoting Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926 (2002)));
see also Ward v. Wilbanks, No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428 (E.D. Mich. July
26, 2010) (upholding a university's authority to require a graduate student
opposed to homosexuality to counsel a homosexual patient).
553. See, e.g., Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 782 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D.
Cal. 1992); see also Hensley v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:07-CV-231 F.,
2010 WL 5437240 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 23, 2010) (upholding the dismissal of a teacher
for her refusal to sign an apology for arguing with a student).
554. See Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District, 566 F.3d 1219, 1222-23,
1230-32 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009), upholding a principal's
action against compelled speech claim where the co-valedictorian had
encouraged the audience "to find out more about the sacrifice He [Jesus Christ]
made for you so that you now have the opportunity to live in eternity with Him"
and where principal required student to include statement that "I realize that,
had I asked ahead of time, I would not have been allowed to say what I did." See
also Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown School District, 249 F.3d 768
(8th Cir. 2001), upholding that as a condition for a student's return from
suspension, she apologize for her letter criticizing the basketball coach.
555. See, e.g., Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979); Dunfey v.
Seabrook Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-140-PB, 2008 WL 1848655 (D.N.H. Apr. 24,
2008); Transcript of Ruling, Lane v. Owens, No. 03-B-1544 (D. Colo. Aug. 15,
2003), available at http://aclu-co.org/case/lane-v-owens (enjoining a school
district from enforcing a statute compelling students and teachers to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance).
556. See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598, 607 (9th Cir.
2004) (upholding condition of sentence that defendant stand outside post office
wearing signboard stating "I stole mail; this is my punishment."); Goldschmitt v.
State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam)
(upholding as a condition of supervised release that a defendant place a bumper
sticker on his vehicle stating "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE");
Brian Rogers, Couple in Theft from DA's Victims Fund Get Probation, HOUS.
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negative speech rights. 58  Moreover, as the Court
anticipated,"' the Keller standard has continued to invite
challenges to state bar expenditures funded by mandatory
dues.56° Even more likely to persist are efforts to overturn
various kinds of compelled commercial speech. A future
Supreme Court docket may well include a challenge to
requirements that cigarette packages and advertisements
carry conspicuous graphic images on their warning labels.5 6'
CHRON., July 8, 2010, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/
7100208.html (convict was required to hold a sign declaring his theft for five
hours every weekend for six years).
557. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(setting aside as a condition for probation that a defendant place an
advertisement in a newspaper that apologized for her conduct leading to her
conviction for D.U.I. and was accompanied by picture taken of her when
booked); Todd v. State, 911 S.W.2d 807, 817-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(upholding as a condition of probation that a defendant found guilty of
criminally negligent homicide write letters of apology to the victim's girlfriend
and family); Keyonna Summers, Teens Must Post Apology on YouTube, USA
TODAY, June 9, 2008, at 3A (discussing a Florida judge's decision ordering teens
to post an apology video on YouTube).
558. See Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An
Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-
Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 786-87 (1999) (suggesting that
"scarlet-letter" conditions may constitute impermissible compelled speech); see
also Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, "Join the Sierra Club!" Imposition of Ideology
as a Condition of Probation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1874, 1884-86 (1994)
(arguing that a requirement that a defendant convicted of environmental crime
join an environmental advocacy organization violates the right against
compelled speech where less restrictive alternative exists).
559. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
560. See, e.g., Kingstad v. State Bar of Wis., 622 F.3d 708, 714-21 (7th Cir.
2010) (upholding the use of dues to a fund campaign to improve the public
image of a state's lawyers).
561. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75
Fed. Reg. 69,524 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141)
(implementing a requirement of graphic warnings under the Family Smoking
Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776); see also Cigarette Health
Warnings, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/
TobaccoProducts/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last visited
July 11, 2011) (describing the requirements of proposed FDA rules for more
graphic health warnings and providing examples of the proposed warnings). On
June 21, 2011, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced
that graphic visual warnings will appear on all packages of cigarettes beginning
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Addressing such issues sensibly does not call for a new
meta-theory of negative speech rights. Rather, the fallacy of
a comprehensive principle hinders a clear-eyed view of the
particular First Amendment values at stake in discrete
forms of compelled speech. As the Legal Realist movement
demonstrated,56 2 perceiving flaws in a sweeping legal vision
can clear the way for a better understanding of law.
Appropriate protection of negative speech rights may lie
largely in recognition of their plurality.
in 2012. Duff Wilson, U.S. Releases Graphic Images to Deter Smokers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2011, at B1.
562. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960, at 193-208 (1992).
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